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Abstract
We initiate the study of computational problems on elliptic curve isogeny graphs defined over
RSA moduli. We conjecture that several variants of the neighbor-search problem over these
graphs are hard, and provide a comprehensive list of cryptanalytic attempts on these problems.
Moreover, based on the hardness of these problems, we provide a construction of groups with
infeasible inversion, where the underlying groups are the ideal class groups of imaginary quadratic
orders.
Recall that in a group with infeasible inversion, computing the inverse of a group element is
required to be hard, while performing the group operation is easy. Motivated by the potential
cryptographic application of building a directed transitive signature scheme, the search for a group
with infeasible inversion was initiated in the theses of Hohenberger and Molnar (2003). Later it
was also shown to provide a broadcast encryption scheme by Irrer et al. (2004). However, to date
the only case of a group with infeasible inversion is implied by the much stronger primitive of
self-bilinear map constructed by Yamakawa et al. (2014) based on the hardness of factoring and
indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Our construction gives a candidate without using iO.
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1 Introduction
Let G denote a finite group written multiplicatively. The discrete-log problem asks to find the
exponent a given g and ga ∈ G. In the groups traditionally used in discrete-log-based cryptosystems,
such as (Z/qZ)∗ [DH76], groups of points on elliptic curves [Mil85, Kob87], and class groups [BW88,
McC88], computing the inverse x−1 = g−a given x = ga is easy. We say G is a group with infeasible
inversion if computing inverses of elements is hard, while performing the group operation is easy
(i.e. given g, ga, gb, computing ga+b is easy).
The search for a group with infeasible inversion was initiated in the theses of Hohenberger [Hoh03] and
Molnar [Mol03], motivated with the potential cryptographic application of constructing a directed
transitive signature. It was also shown by Irrer et al. [ILOP04] to provide a broadcast encryption
scheme. The only existing candidate of such a group, however, is implied by the much stronger
primitive of self-bilinear maps constructed by Yamakawa et al. [YYHK14], assuming the hardness
of integer factorization and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [BGI+01, GGH+13].
In this paper we propose a candidate trapdoor group with infeasible inversion without using iO. The
underlying group is isomorphic to the ideal class group of an imaginary quadratic order (henceforth
abbreviated as “the class group”). In the standard representation1 of the class group, computing the
inverse of a group element is straightforward. The representation we propose uses the volcano-like
structure of the isogeny graphs of ordinary elliptic curves. In fact, the initiation of this work was
driven by the desire to explore the computational problems on the isogeny graphs defined over RSA
moduli.
1.1 Elliptic curve isogenies in cryptography
An isogeny ϕ : E1 → E2 is a morphism of elliptic curves that preserves the identity. Given two isoge-
nous elliptic curves E1, E2 over a finite field, finding an explicit rational polynomial that represents
an isogeny from E1 to E2 is traditionally called the computational isogeny problem.
The study of computing explicit isogenies began with the rather technical motivation of improving
Schoof’s polynomial time algorithm [Sch85] to compute the number of points on an elliptic curve
over a finite field (the improved algorithm is usually called Schoof-Elkies-Atkin algorithm, cf. [CM94,
Sch95, E+98] and references therein). A more straightforward use for explicit isogenies is to transfer
the elliptic curve discrete-log problem from one curve to the other [Gal99, GHS02, JMV05]. If for
any two isogenous elliptic curves computing an isogeny from one to the other is efficient, then it
means the discrete-log problem is equally hard among all the curves in the same isogeny class.
The best way of understanding the nature of the isogeny problem is to look at the isogeny graphs.
Fix a finite field k and a prime ℓ different than the characteristic of k. Then the isogeny graph
Gℓ(k) is defined as follows: each vertex in Gℓ(k) is a j-invariant of an isomorphism class of curves;
two vertices are connected by an edge if there is an isogeny of degree ℓ over k that maps one curve
to another. The structure of the isogeny graph is described in the PhD thesis of Kohel [Koh96].
Roughly speaking, a connected component of an isogeny graph containing ordinary elliptic curves
looks like a volcano (termed in [FM02]). The connected component containing supersingular elliptic
curves, on the other hand, has a different structure. In this article we will focus on the ordinary case.
1By emphasizing the “representation”, we would like to remind the readers that the hardness of group theoretical
problems (like the discrete-log problem) depends on the group representation rather than the group structure. After
all, most of the cryptographically interesting finite groups are chosen to be isomorphic to the innocent looking additive
group Z/nZ, n ∈ N. However, the isomorphism is typically hard to compute.
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Figure 1: Examples of isogeny graphs. Left: a connected component of Gℓ(k), and the corresponding
tower of imaginary quadratic orders [Feo17]; Right: the vertex set is EllO(C) for an imaginary
quadratic order O, the edges represent (isomorphic classes of) isogenies of degrees ℓ, m.
A closer look at the algorithms of computing isogenies. Let k be a finite field of q elements,
ℓ be an integer such that gcd(ℓ, q) = 1. Given the j-invariant of an elliptic curve E, there are at least
two different ways to find all the j-invariants of the curves that are ℓ-isogenous to E (or to a twist
of E) and to find the corresponding rational polynomials that represent the isogenies:
1. Computing kernel subgroups of E of size ℓ, and then applying Ve´lu’s formulae to obtain explicit
isogenies and the j-invariants of the image curves,
2. Calculating the j-invariants of the image curves by solving the ℓth modular polynomial Φℓ over
k, and then constructing explicit isogenies from these j-invariants.
Both methods are able to find all the ℓ-isogenous neighbors over k in time poly(ℓ, log(q)). In other
words, over a finite field, one can take a stroll around the polynomial-degree isogenous neighbors of
a given elliptic curve efficiently.
However, for two random isogenous curves over a sufficiently large field, finding an explicit isogeny
between them seems to be hard, even for quantum computers. The conjectured hardness of com-
puting isogenies was used in a key-exchange and a public-key cryptosystem by Couveignes [Cou06]
and independently by Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [RS06]. Moreover, a hash function and a key ex-
change scheme were proposed based on the hardness of computing isogenies over supersingular curves
[CLG09, JF11]. Isogeny-based cryptography is attracting attention partially due to its conjectured
post-quantum security.
1.2 Isogeny graphs over RSA moduli
Let p, q be primes and let N = pq. In this work we consider computational problems related to
elliptic curve isogeny graphs defined over Z/NZ, where the prime factors p, q of N are unknown.
An isogeny graph over Z/NZ is defined first by fixing the isogeny graphs over Fp and Fq, then
taking a graph tensor product; obtaining the j-invariants in the vertices of the graph over Z/NZ
by the Chinese remainder theorem. Working over the ring Z/NZ without the factors of N creates
new sources of computational hardness from the isogeny problems. Of course, by assuming the
hardness of factorization, we immediately lose the post-quantum privilege of the “traditional” isogeny
problems. From now on all the discussions of hardness are with respect to the polynomial time
classical algorithms.
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Figure 2: Left: the (ℓ,m)-isogenous neighbor problem where gcd(ℓ,m) = 1. Right: the (ℓ, ℓ2)-
isogenous neighbor problem.
Basic neighbor search problem over Z/NZ. When the factorization of N is unknown, it is not
clear how to solve the basic problem of finding (even one of) the ℓ-isogenous neighbors of a given
elliptic curve. The two algorithms over finite fields we mentioned seem to fail over Z/NZ since both
of them require solving polynomials over Z/NZ, which is hard in general when the factorization of
N is unknown. In fact, we show that if it is feasible to find all the ℓ-isogenous neighbors of a given
elliptic curve over Z/NZ, then it is feasible to factorize N .
Joint-neighbor search problem over Z/NZ. Suppose we are given several j-invariants over
Z/NZ that are connected by polynomial-degree isogenies, we ask whether it is feasible to compute
their joint isogenous neighbors. For example, in the isogeny graph on the LHS of Figure 2, suppose
we are given j0, j1, j2, and the degrees ℓ between j0 and j1, and m between j0 and j2 such that
gcd(ℓ,m) = 1. Then we can find j3 which is m-isogenous to j1 and ℓ-isogenous to j2, by computing
the polynomial f(x) = gcd(Φm(j1, x),Φℓ(j2, x)) over Z/NZ. When gcd(ℓ,m) = 1 the polynomial
f(x) turns out to be linear with its only root being j3, hence computing the (ℓ,m) neighbor in this
case is feasible.
However, not all the joint-isogenous neighbors are easy to find. As an example, consider the following
(ℓ, ℓ2)-joint neighbor problem illustrated on the RHS of Figure 2. Suppose we are given j0 and j1 that
are ℓ-isogenous, and asked to find another j-invariant j−1 which is ℓ-isogenous to j0 and ℓ
2-isogenous
to j1. The natural way is to take the gcd of Φℓ(j0, x) and Φℓ2(j1, x), but in this case the resulting
polynomial is of degree ℓ > 1 and we are left with the problem of finding a root of it over Z/NZ,
which is believed to be computationally hard without knowing the factors of N .
Currently we do not know if solving this problem is as hard as factoring N . Neither do we know
of an efficient algorithm of solving the (ℓ, ℓ2)-joint neighbor problem. We will list our attempts in
solving the (ℓ, ℓ2)-joint neighbor problem in Section 5.2.
The conjectured computational hardness of the (ℓ, ℓ2)-joint neighbor problem is fundamental to the
infeasibility of inversion in the group we construct.
1.3 Constructing a trapdoor group with infeasible inversion
To explain the construction of the trapdoor group with infeasible inversion (TGII), it is necessary
to recall the connection of the ideal class groups and elliptic curve isogenies. Let k be a finite
field as before and let E be an elliptic curve over k whose endomorphism ring is isomorphic to an
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Figure 3: A representation of CL(−251) by a 3-isogeny volcano over Z14359 of size h(−251) = 7. The
F83 part is taken from [RS06].
imaginary quadratic order O. The group of invertible O-ideals acts on the set of elliptic curves with
endomorphism ring O. The ideal class group CL(O) acts faithfully and transitively on the set
EllO(k) = {j(E) : E with End(E) ≃ O} .
In other words, there is a map
CL(O)× EllO(k)→ EllO(k), (a, j) 7→ a ∗ j
such that a ∗ (b ∗ j) = (ab) ∗ j for all a, b ∈ CL(O) and j ∈ EllO(k); for any j, j′ ∈ EllO(k), there is a
unique a ∈ CL(O) such that j′ = a ∗ j. The cardinality of EllO(k) equals to the class number h(O).
We are now ready to provide an overview of the TGII construction with a toy example in Figure 3.
Parameter generation. To simplify this overview let us assume that the group CL(O) is cyclic, in
which case the group G with infeasible inversion is exactly CL(O) (in the detailed construction we
usually choose a cyclic subgroup of CL(O)). To generate the public parameter for the group CL(O),
we choose two primes p, q and curves E0,Fp over Fp and E0,Fq over Fq such that the endomorphism
rings of E0,Fp and E0,Fq are both isomorphic to O. Let N = p · q. Let E0 be an elliptic curve over
Z/NZ as the CRT composition of E0,Fp and E0,Fq . The j-invariant of E0, denoted as j0, equals to
the CRT composition of the j-invariants of E0,Fp and E0,Fq . The identity of CL(O) is represented by
j0. The public parameter of the group is (N, j0).
In the example of Figure 3, we set the discriminant D of the imaginary quadratic order O to be −251.
The group order is then the class number h(O) = 7. Choose p = 83, q = 173, N = pq = 14359. Fix
a curve E0 so that j(E0,Fp) = 15, j(E0,Fq ) = 2, then j0 = CRT(83, 173; 15, 2) = 12631. The public
parameter is (14359, 12631).
The encodings. We provide two types of encodings for each group element: the canonical and
composable embeddings. The canonical encoding of an element is uniquely determined once the
public parameter is fixed and it can be directly used in the equivalence test. It, however, does
not support efficient group operations. The composable encoding of an element, on the other hand,
supports efficient group operations with the other composable encodings. Moreover, a composable
encoding can be converted to a canonical encoding by an efficient, public extraction algorithm.
An element x ∈ CL(O) is canonically represented by the j-invariant of the elliptic curve x ∗E0 (once
again, obtained over Fp and Fq then composed by CRT), and we call j(x∗E0) the canonical encoding
of x. Note that the canonical encodings of all the elements are fixed once j0 and N are fixed.
To make things concrete, let a =
√−251 and consider the toy example above. The ideal class
x = [(3, a+12 )] acting on E0 over Fp gives j(x ∗ E0,Fp) = 48, over Fq gives j(x ∗ E0,Fq) = 162. The
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canonical encoding of x is then j1 = CRT(83, 173; 48, 162) = 7601. Similarly, the canonical encodings
of the ideal classes [(7, a−12 )], [(5,
a+7
2 )], [(5,
a+3
2 )], [(7,
a+1
2 )], [(3,
a−1
2 )] are 1766, 4096, 7919, 2711, 1897.
The composable encodings and the composition law. To generate a composable encoding of
x ∈ CL(O), we factorize x as x = ∏xi∈S xeii , where S denotes a generating set, and both the norms
N(xi) and the exponents ei being polynomial in size. The composable encoding of x then consists of
the norms N(xi) and the j-invariants of x
k
i ∗E0, for k ∈ [ei], for i ∈ [|S|]. The degree of a composable
encoding is defined to be the product of the norms of the ideals
∏
xi∈S
N(xi)
ei . Note that the degree
depends on the choice of S and the factorization of x, which is not unique.
As an example let us consider the simplest situation, where the composable encodings are just
the canonical encodings themselves together with the norms of the ideals (i.e. the degrees of the
isogenies). Set the composable encoding of x = [(3, a+12 )] be (3, 7601), the composable encoding of
y = [(7, a−12 )] be (7, 1766).
Let us remark an intricacy of the construction of composable encodings. When the degrees of the
composable encodings of x and y are coprime and polynomially large, the composition of x and y can
be done simply by concatenating the corresponding encodings. To extract the canonical encoding of
x ◦ y, we take the gcd of the modular polynomials. In the example above, the canonical encoding of
x◦y can be obtained by taking the gcd of Φ7(7601, x) and Φ3(1766, x) over Z/NZ. Since the degrees
are coprime, the resulting polynomial is linear, with the only root being 4096, which is the canonical
encoding of [(5, a+72 )].
Note, however, that if the degrees share prime factors, then the gcd algorithm does not yield a linear
polynomial, so the the above algorithm for composition does not go through. To give a concrete
example to what this means let us go back to our example: if we represent y = [(7, a−12 )] by first
factorizing y as [(3, a+12 )]
2 we then get the composable encoding of y as (3, (7601, 1766)). In this case
the gcd of Φ32(7601, x) and Φ3(1766, x) over Z/NZ yields a degree 3 polynomial, where it is unclear
how to extract the roots. Hence, in this case we cannot calculate the canonical embedding of x ◦ y
simply by looking at the gcd.
Therefore, to facilitate the efficient compositions of the encodings of group elements, we will need to
represent them as the product of pairwise co-prime ideals with polynomially large norms. This, in
particular, means the encoding algorithm will need to keep track on the primes used in the degrees
of the composable encodings in the system. In other words, the encoding algorithm is stateful.
The infeasibility of inversion. The infeasibility of inversion amounts to the hardness of the
computation of the canonical embedding of an element x−1 ∈ G from a composable encoding of
x, and it is based on the hardness of the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbors problem for each ideal of a
composable encoding.
Going back to our example, given the composable encoding (3, 7601) of x = [(3, a+12 )], the canonical
encoding of x−1 = [(3, a−12 )] is a root of f(x) = gcd(Φ32(7601, x),Φ3(12631, x)). The degree of f ,
however, is 3, so that it is not clear how to extract the root efficiently over an RSA modulus.
The difficulty of sampling the class group invariants and its implications. Let us remark
that the actual instantiation of TGII is more involved. A number of challenges arise solely from
working with the ideal class groups of imaginary quadratic orders. To give a simple example of the
challenges we face, efficiently generating a class group with a known large prime class number is
a well-known open problem. Additionally, our construction requires more than the class number
(namely, a short basis of the relation lattice of the class group) to support an efficient encoding
algorithm.
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In our solution, we choose the discriminant D to be of size roughly λO(log λ) and polynomially smooth,
so as to make the parameter generation algorithm and the encoding algorithm run in polynomial
time. The discriminant D (i.e. the description of the class group CL(D)) has to be hidden to
preserve the plausible λO(log λ)-security of the TGII. Furthermore, even if D is hidden, there is an
λO(log λ) attack by first guessing D or the group order, then solving the discrete-log problem given
the polynomially-smooth group order. Extending the working parameters regime seems to require
the solutions of several open problems concerning ideal class groups of imaginary quadratic orders.
Summary of the TGII construction. To summarize, our construction of TGII chooses two sets
of j-invariants that correspond to elliptic curves with the same imaginary quadratic order O over Fp
and Fq, and glues the j-invariants via the CRT composition as the canonical encodings of the group
elements in CL(O). The composable encoding of a group element x is given as several j-invariants
that represent the smooth ideals in a factorization of x. The efficiency of solving the (ℓ,m)-joint-
neighbor problem over Z/NZ facilitates the efficient group operation over coprime degree encodings.
The conjectured hardness of the (ℓ, ℓ2)-joint-neighbor problem over Z/NZ is the main reason behind
the hardness of inversion, but it also stops us from composing encodings that share prime factors.
The drawbacks of our construction of TGII are as follows.
1. Composition is only feasible for coprime-degree encodings, which means in order to publish
arbitrarily polynomially many encodings, the encoding algorithm has to be stateful in order to
choose different polynomially large prime factors for the degrees of the encoding (we cannot
choose polynomially large prime degrees and hope they are all different).
2. In the definition from [Hoh03, Mol03], the composable encodings obtained during the composi-
tion are required to be indistinguishable to a freshly sampled encoding. In our construction the
encodings keep growing during compositions, until they are extracted to the canonical encoding
which is a single j-invariant.
3. In addition to the (ℓ, ℓ2)-joint-neighbor problem, the security of the TGII construction relies on
several other heuristic assumptions. We will list our cryptanalytic attempts in §5.3. Moreover,
even if we have not missed any attacks, the current best attack only requires λO(log λ)-time, by
first guessing the discriminant or the group order.
The two applications of TGII. Let us briefly mention the impact of the limitation of our TGII
on the applications of directed transitive signature (DTS) [Hoh03, Mol03] and broadcast encryption
[ILOP04]. For the broadcast encryption from TGII [ILOP04], the growth of the composable encod-
ings do not cause a problem. For DTS, in the direct instantiation of DTS from TGII [Hoh03, Mol03],
the signature is a composable encoding, so the length of the signature keeps growing during the com-
position, which is an undesirable feature for a non-trivial DTS. So on top of the basic instantiation,
we provide an additional compression technique to shrink the composed signature.
Let us also remark that in the directed transitive signature [Hoh03, Mol03], encodings are sampled
by the master signer; in the broadcast encryption scheme [ILOP04], encodings are sampled by the
master encrypter. At least for these two applications, having the master signer/encrypter being
stateful is not ideal but acceptable.
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1.4 Related works
Note that given g and ga over the ring (Z/nZ)∗, computing g−a is feasible for any n. On the other
hand, computing g1/a is infeasible for suitable subgroup G of (Z/nZ)∗. However, in general, it is not
clear how to efficiently perform the multiplicative operation “in the exponent”.
The only existing candidate of (T)GII that supports a large number of group operations is implied
by the self-bilinear maps constructed by Yamakawa et al. [YYHK14] using general purpose indistin-
guishability obfuscation [BGI+01]. The existence of iO is currently considered as a strong assumption
in the cryptography community. Over the past five years many candidates (since [GGH+13]) and
attacks (since [CHL+15]) were proposed for iO. Basing iO on a clearly stated hard mathematical
problem is still an open research area.
Nevertheless, the self-bilinear maps construction from iO is conceptually simple. Here we sketch the
idea. Given an integer N with unknown factorization, a group element a ∈ (Z/φ(N)4 Z)∗ is represented
by ga ∈ QR+(N) (QR+ denotes the signed group of quadratic residues), together with an obfuscation
of the circuit C2a,N :
C2a,N : QR
+(N)→ QR+(N), x 7→ x2a.
Given ga, Obf(C2a,N ), g
b, Obf(C2b,N ), everyone is able to compute g
2ab. [YYHK14] proves that under
the hardness of factoring and assuming that the obfuscator satisfy the security of indistinguishable
obfuscation, it is infeasible for the adversary to compute gab. Such a result implies that under the
same assumption, it is infeasible to compute g1/x given gx and Obf(C2x,N ).
A downside of the self-bilinear maps of [YYHK14] is that the obfuscated circuits, referred to as
“auxiliary inputs”, keep growing after the compositions. Self-bilinear maps without auxiliary input
is recently investigated by [YYHK18] in the context of rings with infeasible inversion, but constructing
such a primitive is open even assuming iO.
2 Preliminaries
Notation and terminology. Let C,R,Q,Z,N denote the set of complex numbers, reals, ratio-
nals, integers, and positive integers respectively. For any field K we fix an algebraic closure and
denote it by K¯. For n ∈ N, let [n] := {1, ..., n}. For B ∈ R, an integer n is called B-smooth if all
the prime factors of n are less than or equal to B. An n-dimensional vector is written as a bold
lower-case letter, e.g. v := (v1, ..., vn). For an index k ∈ N, distinct prime numbers pi for i ∈ [k],
and ci ∈ Z/piZ we will let CRT(p1, ..., pk; c1, ..., ck) to denote the unique y ∈ Z/(
∏k
i pi)Z such that
y ≡ ci (mod pi), for i ∈ [k].
In cryptography, the security parameter (denoted by λ) is a variable that is used to parameterize
the computational complexity of the cryptographic algorithm or protocol, and the adversary’s prob-
ability of breaking security. In theory and by default, an algorithm is called “efficient” if it runs in
probabilistic polynomial time over λ. Exceptions may occur in reality and we will explicitly discuss
them when they come up in our applications.
An n-dimensional lattice Λ is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn that generate it as a vector space
over R. Given n linearly independent vectors B = {b1, ...,bn ∈ Rn}, the lattice generated by B is
Λ(B) = Λ(b1, ...,bn) =
{
n∑
i=1
xi · bi, xi ∈ Z
}
.
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We will denote the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of B by B˜.
Let G denote a finite abelian group. We will denote the prime factorization of its order |G| by
|G| =∏i∈[k] pw(pi)i . For each pi, we set H(pi) := |G|/pw(pi)i , and G(pi) := {gH(pi), g ∈ G}. Note that
with this notation we have the isomorphism
G→ G(p1)× ...×G(pk), g 7→ (gH(p1), ..., gH(pk)).
For a cyclic group G, the discrete-log problem asks to find the exponent a ∈ [|G|] given a generator
g and a group element x = ga ∈ G. The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [PH78] solves the discrete-log
problem in time O
(∑
iw(pi)(log |G|+
√
pi)
)
if the factorization of |G| is known.
Over a possibly non-cyclic group G, the discrete-log problem is defined as follows: given a set of
elements g1, ..., gk and a group element x ∈ G, output a vector e ∈ Zk such that x =
∏k
i=1 g
ei
i , or
decide that x is not in the subgroup generated by {g1, ..., gk}. A generalization of the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm works for non-cyclic groups with essentially the same cost plus an O(log |G|) factor (the
algorithm is folklore [PH78] and is explicitly given in [Tes99]). A further improvement removing the
log |G| factor is given by Sutherland [Sut11b].
2.1 Ideal class groups of imaginary quadratic orders
There are two equivalent ways of describing ideal class groups of imaginary quadratic orders: via the
theory of ideals or quadratic forms. We will be using these two view points interchangeably. The
main references for these are [McC88, Coh95, Cox11].
Let K be an imaginary quadratic field. An order O in K is a subset of K such that
1. O is a subring of K containing 1,
2. O is a finitely generated Z-module,
3. O contains a Q-basis of K.
The ring OK of integers of K is always an order. For any order O, we have O ⊆ OK , in other words
OK is the maximal order of K with respect to inclusion.
The ideal class group (or class group) of O is the quotient group CL(O) = I(O)/P (O) where I(O)
denotes the group of proper (i.e. invertible) fractional O-ideals of, and P (O) is its subgroup of
principal O-ideals. Let D be the discriminant of O. Note that since O is quadratic imaginary we
have D < 0. Sometimes we will denote the class group CL(O) as CL(D), and the class number (the
group order of CL(O)) as h(O) or h(D).
Let D = D0 · f2, where D0 is the fundamental discriminant and f is the conductor of O (or D).
The following well-known formula relates the class number of an non-maximal order to that of the
maximal one:
h(D)
w(D)
=
h(D0)
w(D0)
· f
∏
p|f
(
1−
(
D0
p
)
p
)
, (1)
where w(D) = 6 if D = −3, w(D) = 4 if D = −4, and w(D) = 2 if D < −4. Let us also remark that
the Brauer-Siegel theorem implies that ln(h(D)) ∼ ln(√|D|) as D → −∞.
8
Representations. An O-ideal of discriminant D can be represented by its generators, or by its
binary quadratic forms. A binary quadratic form of discriminant D is a polynomial ax2 + bxy + cy2
with b2 − 4ac = D. We denote a binary quadratic form by (a, b, c). The group SL2(Z) acts on the
set of binary quadratic forms and preserves the discriminant. We shall always be assuming that our
forms are positive definite, i.e. a > 0. Recall that a form (a, b, c) is called primitive if gcd(a, b, c) = 1,
and a primitive form is called reduced if −a < b ≤ a < c or 0 ≤ b ≤ a = c. Reduced forms satisfy
a ≤
√
|D|/3.
A fundamental fact, which goes back to Gauss, is that in each equivalence class, there is a unique
reduced form (see Corollary 5.2.6 of [Coh95]). Given a form (a, b, c), denote [(a, b, c)] as its equivalence
class. Note that when D is fixed, we can denote a class simply by [(a, b, ·)]. Efficient algorithms of
composing forms and computing the reduced form can be found in [McC88, Page 9].
2.2 Elliptic curves and their isogenies
In this section we will recall some background on elliptic curves and isogenies. All of this material is
well-known and the main references for this section are [Koh96, Sil09, Sil13, Sut13a, Feo17].
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field k of characteristic 6= 2, 3 with q elements, given
by its Weierstrass form y2 = x3+ax+ b where a, b ∈ k. By the Hasse bound we know that the order
of the k-rational points E(k) satisfies
−2√q ≤ #E(k)− (q + 1) ≤ 2√q.
Here, t = q + 1 −#E(k) is the trace of Frobenius endomorphism π : (x, y) 7→ (xq, yq). Let us also
recall that Schoof’s algorithm [Sch85] takes as inputs E and q, and computes t, and hence #E(k),
in time poly(log q).
The j-invariant of E is defined as
j(E) = 1728 · 4a
3
4a3 + 27b2
.
The values j = 0 or 1728 are special and we will choose to avoid these two values throughout the
paper. Two elliptic curves are isomorphic over the algebraic closure k¯ if and only if their j-invariants
are the same. Note that this isomorphism may not be defined over the base field k, in which case
the curves are called twists of each other. It will be convenient for us to use j-invariants to represent
isomorphism classes of elliptic curves (including their twists). In many cases, with abuse of notation,
a j-invariant will be treated as the same to an elliptic curve over k in the corresponding isomorphism
class.
Isogenies. An isogeny ϕ : E1 → E2 is a morphism of elliptic curves that preserves the identity.
Every nonzero isogeny induces a surjective group homomorphism from E1(k¯) to E2(k¯) with a finite
kernel. Elliptic curves related by a nonzero isogeny are said to be isogenous. By the Tate isogeny
theorem [Tat66, pg.139] two elliptic curves E1 and E2 are isogenous over k if and only if #E1(k) =
#E2(k).
The degree of an isogeny is its degree as a rational map. An isogeny of degree ℓ is called an ℓ-isogeny.
When char(k) ∤ ℓ, the kernel of an ℓ-isogeny has cardinality ℓ. Two isogenies φ and ϕ are considered
equivalent if φ = ι1◦ϕ◦ι2 for isomorphisms ι1 and ι2. Every ℓ-isogeny ϕ : E1 → E2 has a unique dual
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isogeny ϕˆ : E2 → E1 of the same degree such that ϕ ◦ ϕˆ = ϕˆ ◦ϕ = [ℓ], where [ℓ] is the multiplication
by ℓ map. The kernel of the multiplication-by-ℓ map is the ℓ-torsion subgroup
E[ℓ] =
{
P ∈ E(k¯) : ℓP = 0} .
When ℓ ∤ char(k) we have E[ℓ] ≃ Z/ℓZ × Z/ℓZ. For a prime ℓ 6= char(k), there are ℓ + 1 cyclic
subgroups in E[ℓ] of order ℓ, each corresponding to the kernel of an ℓ-isogeny ϕ from E. An isogeny
from E is defined over k if and only if its kernel subgroup G is defined over k (namely, for P ∈ G
and σ ∈ Gal(k¯/k), σ(P ) ∈ G; note that this does not imply G ⊆ E(k)). If ℓ ∤ char(k) and j(E) 6= 0
or 1728, then up to isomorphism the number of ℓ-isogenies from E defined over k is 0, 1, 2, or ℓ+ 1.
Modular polynomials. Let ℓ ∈ Z, let H denote the upper half plane H := {τ ∈ C : im τ > 0}
and H∗ = H ∪ Q ∪ {∞}. Let j(τ) be the classical modular function defined on H. For any τ ∈ H,
the complex numbers j(τ) and j(ℓτ) are the j-invariants of elliptic curves defined over C that are
related by an isogeny whose kernel is a cyclic group of order ℓ. The minimal polynomial Φℓ(y)
of the function j(ℓz) over the field C(j(z)) has coefficients that are polynomials in j(z) with inter
coefficients. Replacing j(z) with a variable x gives themodular polynomial Φℓ(x, y) ∈ Z[x, y], which is
symmetric in x and y. It parameterizes pairs of elliptic curves over C related by a cyclic ℓ-isogeny (an
isogeny is said to be cyclic if its kernel is a cyclic group; when ℓ is a prime every ℓ-isogeny is cyclic).
The modular equation Φℓ(x, y) = 0 is a canonical equation for the modular curve Y0(ℓ) = H/Γ0(ℓ),
where Γ0(ℓ) is the congruence subgroup of SL2(Z) defined by
Γ0(ℓ) =
{(
a b
c d
)
∈ SL2(Z)
∣∣∣∣
(
a b
c d
)
≡
(∗ ∗
0 ∗
)
(mod ℓ)
}
.
The time and space required for computing the modular polynomial Φℓ are polynomial in ℓ, cf.
[E+98, § 3] or [Coh95, Page 386]. In this article we will only use {Φℓ ∈ Z[x, y]}ℓ∈poly(λ), so we might
as well assume that the modular polynomials are computed ahead of time2. In reality the coefficients
of Φℓ over Z[x, y] grow significantly with ℓ, so computing Φℓ over k[x, y] directly is preferable using
the improved algorithms of [CL05, BLS12], or even Φℓ(j1, y) over k[y] using [Sut13b].
2.3 Isogeny volcanoes and the class groups
An isogeny from an elliptic curve E to itself is called an endomorphism. Over a finite field k, End(E)
is isomorphic to an imaginary quadratic order when E is ordinary, or an order in a definite quaternion
algebra when E is supersingular. In this paper we will be focusing on the ordinary case.
Isogeny graphs. These are graphs capturing the relation of being ℓ-isogenous among elliptic curves
over a finite field k.
Definition 2.1 (ℓ-isogeny graph). Fix a prime ℓ and a finite field k such that char(k) 6= ℓ. The
ℓ-isogeny graph Gℓ(k) has vertex set k. Two vertices (j1, j2) have a directed edge (from j1 to j2)
with multiplicity equal to the multiplicity of j2 as a root of Φℓ(j1, Y ). The vertices of Gℓ(k) are
j-invariants and each edge corresponds to an (isomorphism class of an) ℓ-isogeny.
2The modular polynomials Φℓ for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 300 are available at
https://math.mit.edu/˜drew/ClassicalModPolys.html.
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For j1, j2 /∈ {0, 1728}, an edge (j1, j2) occurs with the same multiplicity as (j2, j1) and thus the
subgraph of Gℓ(k) on k\{0, 1728} can be viewed as an undirected graph. Every curve in the isogeny
class of a supersingular curve is supersingular. Accordingly, Gℓ(k) has supersingular and ordinary
components. The ordinary components of Gℓ(k) look like ℓ-volcanoes:
Definition 2.2 (ℓ-volcano). Fix a prime ℓ. An ℓ-volcano V is a connected undirected graph whose
vertices are partitioned into one or more levels V0, ..., Vd such that the following hold:
1. The subgraph on V0 (the surface, or the crater) is a regular graph of degree at most 2.
2. For i > 0, each vertex in Vi has exactly one neighbor in level Vi−1.
3. For i < d, each vertex in Vi has degree ℓ+ 1.
Let φ : E1 → E2 by an ℓ-isogeny of elliptic curves with endomorphism rings O1 = End(E1) and
O2 = End(E2) respectively. Then, there are three possibilities for O1 and O2:
• If O1 = O2, then φ is called horizontal,
• If [O1 : O2] = ℓ, then φ is called descending,
• If [O2 : O1] = ℓ, then φ is called ascending.
Let E be an elliptic curve over k whose endomorphism ring is isomorphic to an imaginary quadratic
order O. Then, the set
EllO(k) = {j(E) ∈ k | with End(E) ≃ O}
is naturally a CL(O)-torsor as follows: For an invertible O-ideal a the a-torsion subgroup
E[a] =
{
P ∈ E(k¯) : α(P ) = 0,∀α ∈ a}
is the kernel of a separable isogeny φa : E → E′. If the norm N(a) = [O : a] is not divisible
by char(k), then the degree of φa is N(a). Moreover, if a and b are two invertible O-ideals, then
φab = φaφb, and if a is principal then φa is an isomorphism. This gives a faithful and transitive
action of CL(O) on EllO(k).
Every horizontal ℓ-isogeny arises this way from the action of an invertible O-ideal l of norm ℓ. Let
K denote the fraction field of O and OK be its ring of integers. If ℓ | [OK : O] then no such ideal
exists. Otherwise, O is said to be maximal at ℓ and there are 1 + (Dℓ ) horizontal ℓ-isogenies.
Remark 2.3 (Linking ideals and horizontal isogenies). When ℓ splits in O we have (ℓ) = l · l¯. Fix an
elliptic curve E(k) with End(E) ≃ O, the two horizontal isogenies φ1 : E → E1 and φ2 : E → E2 can
be efficiently associated with the two ideals l and l¯ when ℓ ∈ poly(λ) (cf. [Sch95]). To do so, factorize
the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius π as (x−µ)(x−ν) (mod ℓ), where µ, ν ∈ Z/ℓZ. Given an
ℓ-isogeny φ from E to E/G, the eigenvalue (say µ) corresponding to the eigenspace G can be verified
by picking a point P ∈ G, then check whether π(P ) = [µ]P modulo G. If so then µ corresponds to φ.
The following fundamental result of Kohel summarizes the above discussion and more.
Lemma 2.4 ([Koh96]). Let ℓ be a prime. Let V be an ordinary component of Gℓ(Fq) that does not
contain 0 or 1728. Then V is an ℓ-volcano for which the following hold:
1. The vertices in level Vi all have the same endomorphism ring Oi.
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2. The subgraph on V0 has degree 1 +
(
D0
ℓ
)
, where D0 = disc(O0).
3. If
(
D0
ℓ
) ≥ 0, then |V0| is the order of [l] in CL(O0); otherwise |V0| = 1.
4. The depth of V is d, where 2d is the largest power of ℓ dividing (t2− 4q)/D0, and t2 = tr(πE)2
for j(E) ∈ V .
5. ℓ ∤ [OK : O0] and [Oi : Oi+1] = ℓ for 0 ≤ i < d.
Let GO,m(k) be the regular graph whose vertices are the elements of EllO(k), and whose edges are
the equivalence classes of horizontal isogenies defined over k of prime degrees ≤ m. The following
result states that assuming GRH GO,m(k) is an expander graph.
Lemma 2.5 ([JMV05, BGK+18]). Let q = #k, O be an imaginary quadratic order of discriminant
D, and ǫ be a fixed constant. Let m be such that m ≥ (log q)2+ǫ. Assuming GRH, a random walk on
GO,m(k) will reach a subset of size S with probability at least S2|GO,m(k)| after polylog(q) many steps.
Furthermore, for a suitable constant C and any δ > 0, assuming GRH, the distribution of a vertice
obtained from a random walk on GO,m(k) of length C · δ+log h(D)ǫ·log log |D| is e−δ-statistically close to uniform.
More about the endomorphism ring from a computational perspective. Given an ordi-
nary curve E over k, its endomorphism ring O can be determined by first computing the trace t of
Frobenius endomorphism π, then computing t2− 4q = v2D0, where v2D0 is the discriminant of Z[π],
Z[π] ⊆ O ⊆ OK , and K = Q(
√
D0). The discriminant of O is then u2D0 for some u | v. When v
has only few small factors, determining the endomorphism ring can be done in time polynomial in
log(q) [Koh96]. In general it can take up to subexponential time in log(q) under GRH [BS11, Bis11].
Let O be an imaginary quadratic order of discriminant D. Let HD(x) be the Hilbert class polynomial
defined by
HD(x) =
∏
j(E)∈EllO(C)
(x− j(E)).
HD has integer coefficients and is of degree h(D). Furthermore, it takes O(|D|1+ǫ) bits of storage.
Under GRH, computing HD mod q takes O(|D|1+ǫ) time and O(|D|1/2+ǫ log q) space [Sut11a]. In
reality HD is only feasible for small |D| since it takes a solid amount of space to store HD. Over
Z[x], [Sut11a] is able to compute HD for |D| ≈ 1013 and h(D) ≈ 106. Over Fq[x], [Sut12b] is able to
compute HD for |D| ≈ 1016 with q ≈ 2256.
3 Isogeny graphs over composite moduli
Let p, q be distinct primes and set N = pq. We will be using elliptic curves over the ring Z/NZ.
We will not be needing a formal treatment of elliptic curves over rings as such a discussion would
take us too far afield. Instead, we will be defining objects and quantities over Z/NZ by taking the
CRT of the corresponding ones over Fp and Fq, which will suffice for our purposes. This follows the
treatment given in [Len87].
Since the underlying rings will matter, we will denote an elliptic curve over a ring R by E(R). If
R is clear from the context we shall omit it from the notation. To begin, let us remark that the
number of points #(E(Z/NZ)) is equal to #(E(Fp)) ·#(E(Fq)), and the j-invariant of E(Z/NZ) is
CRT(p, q; j(E(Fp)), j(E(Fq))).
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3.1 Isogeny graphs over Z/NZ
Let N be as above. For every prime ℓ ∤ N the isogeny graph Gℓ(Z/NZ) can be defined naturally as
the graph tensor product of Gℓ(Fp) and Gℓ(Fq).
Definition 3.1 (ℓ-isogeny graph over Z/NZ). Let ℓ, p, and q be distinct primes and let N = pq.
The ℓ-isogeny graph Gℓ(Z/NZ) has
• The vertex set of Gℓ(Z/NZ) is Z/NZ, identified with Z/pZ× Z/qZ by CRT,
• Two vertices v1 = (v1,p, v1,q) and v2 = (v2,p, v2,q) are connected if and only if v1,p is connected
to v2,p in Gℓ(Fp) and v1,q is connected to v2,q in Gℓ(Fq).
Let us make a remark for future consideration. In the construction of groups with infeasible inver-
sion, we will be working with special subgraphs of Gℓ(Z/NZ), where the vertices over Fp and Fq
correspond to j-invariants of curves whose endomorphism rings are the same imaginary quadratic
order O. Nevertheless, this is a choice we made for convenience, and it does not hurt to define the
computational problems over the largest possible graph and to study them first.
3.2 The ℓ-isogenous neighbors problem over Z/NZ
Definition 3.2 (The ℓ-isogenous neighbors problem). Let p, q be two distinct primes and let N = pq.
Let ℓ be a polynomially large prime s.t. gcd(ℓ,N) = 1. The input of the ℓ-isogenous neighbor
problem is N and an integer j ∈ Z/NZ such that there exists (possibly more than) one integer j′ that
Φℓ(j, j
′) = 0 over Z/NZ. The problem asks to find such integer(s) j′.
The following theorem shows that the problem of finding all of the ℓ-isogenous neighbors is at least
as hard as factoring N .
Theorem 3.3. If there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that finds all the ℓ-isogenous
neighbors in Problem 3.2, then there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that solves the
integer factorization problem.
The idea behind the reduction is as follows. Suppose it is efficient to pick an integer j over Z/NZ,
let jp = j (mod p) and jq = j (mod q), such that jp has at least two distinct neighbors in Gℓ(Fp),
and jq has at least two distinct neighbors in Gℓ(Fq). In this case if we are able to find all the integer
solutions j′ ∈ Z/NZ such that Φℓ(j, j′) = 0 over Z/NZ, then there exist two distinct integers j′1 and
j′2 among the solutions such that N > gcd(j
′
1− j′2, N) > 1. One can also show that finding one of the
integer solutions is hard using a probabilistic argument, assuming the underlying algorithm outputs
a random solution when there are multiple ones.
In the reduction we pick the elliptic curve E randomly, so we have to make sure that for a non-
negligible fraction of the elliptic curves E over Fp, j(E) ∈ Gℓ(Fp) has at least two neighbors. The
estimate for this relies on the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4 ([Len87] (1.9)). There exists an efficiently computable positive constant c such that for
each prime number p > 3, for a set of integers S ⊆ {s ∈ Z | |p+ 1− s| < √p}, we have
#′ {E | E is an elliptic curve over Fp, #E(Fp) ∈ S}/≃Fp ≥ c (#S − 2)
√
p
log p
.
where #′ {E}/≃Fp denotes the number of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over Fp, each counted
with weight (#AutE)−1.
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Theorem 3.5. Let p, ℓ be primes such that 6ℓ <
√
p. The probability that for a random elliptic curve
E over Fp (i.e. a random pair (a, b) ∈ Fp × Fp such that 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0) j(E) ∈ Gℓ(Fp) having at
least two neighbors is Ω( 1log p).
Proof of Theorem 3.5. We first give a lower bound on the number of ordinary elliptic curves over Fp
whose endomorphism ring has discriminant D such that
(
D
ℓ
)
= 1. If for some pair of (ℓ, p) there are
not enough elliptic curves over Fp with two horizontal ℓ-isogenies then we count the elliptic curves
with vertical ℓ-isogenies.
We start with estimating the portion of t ∈ [ℓ] that satisfies (t2−4pℓ ) = 1:
Pr
t∈[ℓ]
[(
t2 − 4p
ℓ
)
= 1
]
=


0 ℓ = 2
1
2 − 32ℓ ℓ > 2 and
(4p
ℓ
)
= 1
1
2 − 12ℓ ℓ > 2 and
(4p
ℓ
)
= −1
(2)
where the last two equations follows the identity3
∑ℓ
t=1
(t2−4p
ℓ
)
= −1. Hence for ℓ ≥ 5 or ℓ = 3 and(4p
3
)
=
(p
3
)
= −1, no less than 12 − 32ℓ of the t ∈ [ℓ] satisfy
(t2−4p
ℓ
)
= 1.
We now estimate the number of elliptic curves over Fp whose discriminant of the endomorphism ring
D satisfies
(
D
ℓ
)
= 1. To do so we set r = ⌊√p/ℓ⌋, and use Lemma 3.4 by choosing the set S as
S =
{
s
∣∣∣∣
(
(p + 1− s)2 − 4p
ℓ
)
= 1, s ∈ {(p+ 1)− r · ℓ, ..., (p + 1) + r · ℓ} \ {p+ 1}
}
.
Note that #S ≥ r(ℓ− 3). Therefore, Lemma 3.4, there exists an effectively computable constant c
such that the number of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over Fp with the number of points in
the set S is greater or equal to
c · (r(ℓ− 3)− 2) ·
√
p
log p
≥ c · ((
√
p
ℓ
− 1)(ℓ− 3)− 2) ·
√
p
log p
> c · (
√
p
2ℓ
· ℓ
3
− 2) ·
√
p
log p
≥ c · p
18 log p
. (3)
Since the total number of elliptic curves over Fp is p
2 − p; the number of elliptic curves isomorphic
to a given elliptic curve E is (p−1)#AutE [Len87, (1.4)]. So for ℓ ≥ 5 or ℓ = 3 and
(4p
3
)
= −1, the ratio of
elliptic curves over Fp with discriminant D such that
(
D
ℓ
)
= 1 is Ω( 1log p).
To finish the treatment of the case, where ℓ ≥ 5, or ℓ = 3 and (4p3 ) = (p3) = −1, we will show that
among such curves the proportion of the j-invariants j(E) on the crater of the volcano having one
or two neighbors is o( 1log p). Recall that we are in the case ℓ ∤ D and ℓ = l1l2 in Q(
√
D), and that the
crater has size equals to the order of l1 (which is the same as the order of l2) in CL(O).
If the crater has 1 or 2 vertices, l1 must have order dividing 2 in CL(O). If l1 has order 1 in CL(O)
then we have x2 −Dy2 = ℓ for some x, y ∈ Z. Since ℓ is prime we necessarily have y 6= 0. Moreover,
since 6ℓ <
√
p we have −D < √p and therefore 4p − √p < t2. On the other hand, by the Hasse
bound we have t2 ≤ 4p, hence 4p − √p < t2 ≤ 4p. Therefore, there are at most O(p 14 ) j-invariants
for which the the top of the volcano consists of a single vertex. This handles the case of l1 having
order 1.
The remaining case of l1 having order 2, on the other hand, cannot happen because of genus theory.
More precisely, let D0 be the discriminant of Q(
√
D). Since l1 has order 2 in CL(D) and l1 ∤ D it
has order 2 in the class group CL(D0) of Q(
√
D). Now, recall that, by genus theory, the 2-torsion in
3Derived from Theorem 19 in http://www.imomath.com/index.php?options=328&lmm=0.
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CL(D0) is generated by primes dividing D0. Therefore, if l1 has order 2, then l1 | D0, which gives a
contradiction.
Therefore, in the case of
(
D
ℓ
)
= 1 the probability that a random j(E) ∈ Fp having ≤ 2 neighbors on
the crater of the volcano is O(p−
3
4 ) = o( 1log p), which finishes the treatment of the case ℓ ≥ 5 or ℓ = 3
and
(4p
3
)
=
(p
3
)
= −1.
For the remaining cases, where ℓ = 2, or ℓ = 3 and
(p
3
)
= 1, we count the number of vertical isogenies.
Following the formula for the depth of an isogeny volcano in Lemma 2.4, for an elliptic curve E(Fp)
of trace t with ℓ2 | t2 − 4p, the curve lives on the part of the volcano of depth ≥ 1. In this case we
only need to make sure that the curve does not live at the bottom of the volcano because otherwise
it will necessarily have at least ℓ-neighbors (if it is at the bottom it has only one neighbor).
When ℓ = 2, every t = 2t1 satisfies 4 | t2 − 4p. So every t ∈ [−2√p, 2√p] ∩ 2Z corresponds to trace
of an elliptic curve over Fp with at least two neighbors.
When ℓ = 3 and
(p
3
)
= 1, Hensel’s lemma implies that 29 of the t ∈ [−2
√
p, 2
√
p] ∩ Z satisfy t2 ≡
4p mod 9. These all correspond to traces of an elliptic curves over Fp with at least two neighbors.
Finally, in both cases using Lemma 3.4 with a set S that takes a constant fraction from [p + 1 −√
p, p+1+
√
p]∩Z, we see that the O( 1log p) lower bound also applies for ℓ = 2 or ℓ = 3 and
(p
3
)
= 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Suppose that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A that finds
all the ℓ-isogenous neighbors in Problem 3.2 with non-negligible probability η. We will build a
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A′ that solves factoring. Given an integer N , A′ samples
two random integers a, b ∈ Z/NZ such that 4a3+27b2 6= 0, and computes j = 1728· 4a3
4a3+27b2
. With all
but negligible probability gcd(j,N) = 1 and j 6= 0, 1728; if j happens to satisfy 1 < gcd(j,N) < N ,
then A′ outputs gcd(j,N).
A′ then sends N, j0 to the solver A for Problem 3.2 for a fixed polynomially large prime ℓ, gets back
a set of solutions J = {ji}i∈[k], where 0 ≤ k ≤ (ℓ + 1)2 denotes the number of solutions. With
probability Ω( 1
log2N
), the curve E : y2 = x3 + ax + b has at least two ℓ-isogenies over both Fp and
Fq due to Theorem 3.5. In that case there exists j, j
′ ∈ J such that 1 < gcd(j − j′, N) < N , which
gives a prime factor of N .
3.3 The (ℓ,m)-isogenous neighbors problem over Z/NZ
Definition 3.6 (The (ℓ,m)-isogenous neighbors problem). Let p and q be two distinct primes. Let
N := p · q. Let ℓ, m be two polynomially large integers s.t. gcd(ℓm,N) = 1. The input of the
(ℓ,m)-isogenous neighbor problem is the j-invariants j1, j2 of two elliptic curves E1, E2 defined over
Z/NZ. The problem asks to find all the integers j′ such that Φℓ(j(E1), j
′) = 0, and Φm(j(E2), j
′) = 0
over Z/NZ.
When gcd(ℓ,m) = 1, applying the Euclidean algorithm on Φℓ(j1, x) and Φm(j2, x) gives a linear
polynomial over x.
Lemma 3.7 ([ES10]). Let j1, j2 ∈ EllO(Fp), and let ℓ,m 6= p be distinct primes with 4ℓ2m2 < |D|.
Then the degree of f(x) := gcd(Φℓ(j1, x),Φm(j2, x)) is less than or equal to 1.
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When gcd(ℓ,m) = d > 1, applying the Euclidean algorithm on Φℓ(j1, x) and Φm(j2, x) gives a
polynomial of degree at least d. We present a proof in the the case where m = ℓ2, which has the
general idea.
Lemma 3.8. Let p 6= 2, 3 and ℓ 6= p be primes, and let j0, j1 be such that Φℓ(j0, j1) = 0 mod p. Let
Φℓ(X, j0) and Φℓ2(X, j1) be the modular polynomials of levels ℓ and ℓ
2 respectively. Then,
(X − j1) · gcd(Φℓ(X, j0),Φℓ2(X, j1)) = Φℓ(X, j0)
in Fp[X]. In particular,
deg(gcd(Φℓ(X, j0),Φℓ2(X, j1))) = ℓ
Proof. Without loss of generality we can, and we do, assume that Φℓ(X, j0), Φℓ(X, j1), and Φℓ2(X, j1)
split over Fp (otherwise we can base change to an extension k
′/Fp, where the full ℓ
2-torsion is defined,
this does not affect the degree of the gcd).
Assume that the degree of the gcd is Ngcd. We have,
deg(Φℓ(X, j0)) = ℓ+ 1, deg(Φℓ2(X, j1)) = ℓ(ℓ+ 1). (4)
Let E0, E1 denote the (isomorphism classes of) elliptic curves with j-invariants j0 and j1 respectively,
and ϕℓ : E0 → E1 be the corresponding isogeny. We count the number Nℓ2 of cyclic ℓ2-isogenies
from E1 two ways. First, Nℓ2 is the number of roots of Φℓ2(X, j1), which, by (4) and the assumption
that ℓ2 + ℓ < p, is ℓ2 + ℓ.
Next, recall (cf. Corollary 6.11 of [Sut]) that every isogeny of degree ℓ2 can be decomposed as a
composition of two degree ℓ isogenies (which are necessarily cyclic). Using this Nℓ2 is bounded above
by Ngcd + ℓ
2, where the first factor counts the number of ℓ2-isogenies E1 → E that are compositions
E1
ϕˆℓ−→ E0 → E, and the second factor counts the isogenies that are compositions E1 → E′ → E,
where E′ ≇ E1. Note that we are not counting compositions E1
φ−→ E˜ φˆ−→ E1 since these do not give
rise to cyclic isogenies.
This shows that ℓ2 + ℓ ≤ ℓ2 + Nℓ2 ⇒ Ngcd ≥ ℓ. On the other hand, by (4) Ngcd ≤ ℓ since
Φℓ(X, j0)/(X − j0) has degree ℓ and each root except for j1 gives a (possibly cyclic) ℓ2-isogeny by
composition with ϕˆℓ. This implies that Ngcd = ℓ and that all the ℓ
2-isogenies obtained this way are
cyclic. In particular, we get that the gcd is Φℓ(X, j0)/(X − j1).
Discussions. Let us remark that we do not know if solving the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbors problem
is as hard as factoring. To adapt the same reduction in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we need the
feasibility of sampling two integers j1, j2 such that Φℓ(j1, j2) = 0 (mod N), and j1 or j2 has to have
another isogenous neighbor over Fp or Fq. However the feasibility is unclear to us in general.
From the cryptanalytic point of view, a significant difference of the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbors prob-
lem and the ℓ-isogenous neighbors problem is the following. Let ℓ be an odd prime. Recall that an
isogeny φ : E1 → E2 of degree ℓ can be represented by a rational polynomial
φ : E1 → E2, (x, y) 7→
(
f(x)
h(x)2
,
g(x, y)
h(x)3
)
,
where h(x) is its kernel polynomial of degree ℓ−12 . The roots of h(x) are the x-coordinates of the
kernel subgroup G ⊂ E1[ℓ] such that φ : E1 → E1/G.
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Given a single j-invariant j′ over Z/NZ, it is infeasible to find a rational polynomial φ of degree ℓ
that maps from a curve E with j-invariant j′ to another curve j′′, since otherwise j′′ is a solution to
the ℓ-isogenous neighbors problem. However, if we are given two j-invariants j1, j2 ∈ Z/NZ such that
Φℓ(j1, j2) = 0 (mod N), as in the (ℓ, ℓ
2)-isogenous neighbors problem; then it is feasible to compute a
pair of curves E1, E2 such that j(E1) = j1, j(E2) = j2, together with an explicit rational polynomial
of an ℓ-isogeny from E1 to E2. This is because the arithmetic operations involved in computing the
kernel polynomial h(x) mentioned in [CM94, Sch95, E+98] works over Z/NZ by reduction mod N ,
and does not require the factorization of N .
Proposition 3.9. Given ℓ,N ∈ Z such that gcd(ℓ,N) = 1, and two integers j1, j2 ∈ Z/NZ such that
Φℓ(j1, j2) = 0 over Z/NZ, the elliptic curves E1, E2, and the kernel polynomial h(x) of an isogeny
φ from E1, E2 can be computed in time polynomial in ℓ, log(N). From the kernel polynomial h(x)
of an isogeny φ, computing f(x), g(x, y), hence the entire rational polynomial of φ, is feasible over
Z/NZ via Ve´lu’s formulae [Ve´l71].
However, it is unclear how to utilize the rational polynomial to solve the (ℓ, ℓ2)-joint neighbors
problem. We postpone further discussions on the hardness and cryptanalysis to Section 5.
4 Trapdoor group with infeasible inversion
In this section we present the construction of the trapdoor group with infeasible inversion. As the
general construction is somewhat technical we will present it in two steps: first we will go over
the basic algorithms that feature a simple encoding and composition rule, which suffices for the
instantiations of the applications; we will then move to the general algorithms that offer potential
optimization and flexibility.
4.1 Definitions
Let us first provide the definition of a TGII, adapted from the original definition in [Hoh03, Mol03]
to match our construction. The main differences are:
1. The trapdoor in the definition of [Hoh03, Mol03] is only used to invert an encoded group
element, whereas we assume the trapdoor can be use to encode and decode (which implies the
ability of inverting).
2. We classify the encodings of the group elements as canonical encodings and composable en-
codings, whereas the definition from [Hoh03, Mol03] does not. In our definition, the canonical
encoding of an element is uniquely determined once the public parameter is fixed. It can
be directly used in the equivalence test, but it does not support efficient group operations.
Composable encodings of group elements support efficient group operations. A composable en-
coding, moreover, can be converted into a canonical encoding by an efficient, public extraction
algorithm.
Definition 4.1. Let G = (◦, 1G) be a finite multiplicative group where ◦ denotes the group operator,
and 1G denotes the identity. For x ∈ G, denote its inverse by x−1. G is associated with the following
efficient algorithms:
Parameter generation. Gen(1λ) takes as input the security parameter 1λ, outputs the public pa-
rameter PP and the trapdoor τ .
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Private sampling. TrapSam(PP, τ, x) takes as inputs the public parameter PP, the trapdoor τ ,
and a plaintext group element x ∈ G, outputs a composable encoding enc(x).
Composition. Compose(PP, enc(x), enc(y)) takes as inputs the public parameter PP, two compos-
able encodings enc(x), enc(y), outputs enc(x ◦ y). We often use the notation enc(x) ◦ enc(y) for
Compose(PP, enc(x), enc(y)).
Extraction. Ext(PP, enc(x)) takes as inputs the public parameter PP, a composable encoding enc(x)
of x, outputs the canonical encoding of x as enc∗(x).
The hardness of inversion requires that it is infeasible for any efficient algorithm to produce the
canonical encoding of x−1 given a composable encoding of x ∈ G.
Hardness of inversion. For any p.p.t. algorithm A,
Pr[z = enc∗(x−1) | z ← A(PP, enc(x))] < negl(λ),
where the probability is taken over the randomness in the generation of PP, x, enc(x), and the
adversary A.
4.2 Construction - 1: Basic setting
In this section we provide the formal construction of the TGII with the basic setting of algorithms.
The basic setting assumes that in the application of TGII, the encoding sampling algorithm can be
stateful, and it is easy to determine which encodings have to be pairwise composable, and which are
not. Under these assumptions, we show that we can always sample composable encodings so that
the composition always succeeds. That is, the degrees of the any two encodings are chosen to be
coprime if they will be composed in the application, and not coprime if they will not be composed.
The reader may be wondering why we are distinguishing pairs that are composable and those that
are not, as opposed to simply assuming that every pairs of encoding are composable. The reason is
for security, meanly due to the parallelogram attack in §5.3.2.
The basic setting suffices for instantiating the directed transitive signature [Hoh03, Mol03] and
the broadcast encryption schemes [ILOP04], where the master signer and the master encrypter are
stateful. We will explain how to determine which encodings are pairwise composable in these two
applications, so as to determine the prime degrees of the encodings (the rest of the parameters are
not application-specific and follow the universal solution from this section).
For convenience of the reader and for further reference, we provide in Figure 4 a summary of the pa-
rameters, with the basic constraints they should satisfy, and whether they are public or hidden. The
correctness and efficiency reasons behind these constraints will be detailed in the coming paragraphs,
whereas the security reasons will be explained in §5.
Parameter generation. The parameter generation algorithm Gen(1λ) takes the security param-
eter 1λ as input, first chooses a non-maximal order O of an imaginary quadratic field as follows:
1. Select a square-free negative integer D0 ≡ 1 mod 4 as the fundamental discriminant, such that
D0 is polynomially large and h(D0) is a prime.
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Parameters Basic constraints Public?
The modulus N N = pq, p, q are primes, |p|, |q| ∈ poly(λ) Yes
The identity j(E0) End(E0(Fp)) ≃ End(E0(Fq)) ≃ O Yes
#(E0(Fp)), #(E0(Fq)) not polynomially smooth No
The discriminant D of O D = D0 · f2, D ≈ λO(log λ), D is polynomially smooth No
The class number h(D) follows the choice of D No
A set S in an encoding: S = {Ci = [(pi, bi, ·)]}i∈[w] generates CL(D)odd See below
The number w of ideals w ∈ O(log λ) Yes
The degree pi of isogenies pi ∈ poly(λ) Yes
The basis B of ΛS ‖B˜‖ ∈ poly(λ) No
Figure 4: Summary of the choices of parameters in the basic setting.
2. Choose k = O(log(λ)), and a set of distinct polynomially large prime numbers {fi}i∈[k] such
that the odd-part of
(
fi −
(
D0
fi
))
is square-free and not divisible by h(D0). Let f =
∏
i∈[k] fi.
3. Set D = f2D0. Recall from Eqn. (1) that
h(D) = 2 · h(D0)
w(D0)
∏
i∈[k]
(
fi −
(
D0
fi
))
(5)
Let CL(O)odd be the odd part of CL(O), h(D)odd be largest odd factor of h(D). Note that due to
the choices of D0 and {fi}, CL(O)odd is cyclic, and we have |D|, h(D)odd ∈ λO(log λ). The group with
infeasible inversion G is then CL(O)odd with group order h(D)odd.
We then sample the public parameters as follows:
1. Choose two primes p, q, and elliptic curves E0,Fp , E0,Fq with discriminant D, using the CM
method (cf. [LZ94] and more).
2. Check whether p and q are safe RSA primes (if not, then back to the previous step and restart).
Also, check whether the number of points #(E0(Fp)), #(E0(Fq)), #(E˜0(Fp)), #(E˜0(Fq)) (where
E˜ denotes the quadratic twist of E) are polynomially smooth (if yes, then back to the previous
step and restart). p, q and the number of points should be hidden for security.
3. Set the modulus N as N := p · q and let j0 = CRT(p, q; j(E0,Fp), j(E0,Fq )). Let j0 represent the
identity of G.
Output (N, j0) as the public parameter PP. Keep (D, p, q) as the trapdoor τ (D and the group order
of G should be hidden for security).
The sampling algorithm and the group operation of the composable encodings. Next
we provide the definitions and the algorithms for the composable encoding.
Definition 4.2 (Composable encoding). Given a factorization of x as
∏w
i=1 C
ei
i , where w ∈ O(log λ);
Ci = [(pi, bi, ·)] ∈ G, ei ∈ N, for i ∈ [w]. A composable encoding of x ∈ G is represented by
enc(x) = (L;T1, ..., Tw) = ((p1, ..., pw); (j1,1, ..., j1,e1), ..., (jw,1, ..., jw,ew)),
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where all the primes in the list L = (p1, ..., pw) are distinct; for each i ∈ [w], Ti ∈ (Z/NZ)ei is a list
of the j-invariants such that ji,k = C
k
i ∗ j0, for k ∈ [ei].
The degree of an encoding enc(x) is defined to be d(enc(x)) :=
∏w
i=1 p
ei
i .
Notice that the factorization of x =
∏w
i=1C
ei
i has to satisfy ei ∈ poly(λ), for all i ∈ [w], so as to
ensure the length of enc(x) is polynomial. Looking ahead, we also require each pi, the degree of the
isogeny that represents the Ci-action, to be polynomially large so as to ensure Algorithm 4.3 in the
encoding sampling algorithm and Algorithm 4.9 in the extraction algorithm run in polynomial time.
The composable encoding sampling algorithm requires the following subroutine:
Algorithm 4.3. act(τ, j, C) takes as input the trapdoor τ = (D, p, q), a j-invariant j ∈ Z/NZ, and
an ideal class C ∈ CL(O), proceeds as follows:
1. Let jp = j mod p, jq = j mod q.
2. Compute j′p := C ∗ jp ∈ Fp, j′q := C ∗ jq ∈ Fq.
3. Output j′ := CRT(p, q; j′p, j
′
q).
Algorithm 4.4 (Sample a composable encoding). Given as input the public parameter PP = (N, j0),
the trapdoor τ = (D, p, q), and x ∈ G, TrapSam(PP, τ, x) produces a composable encoding of x is
sampled as follows:
1. Choose w ∈ O(log λ) and a generation set S = {Ci = [(pi, bi, ·)]}i∈[w] ⊂ G.
2. Sample a short basis B (in the sense that ‖B˜‖ ∈ poly(λ)) for the relation lattice ΛS:
ΛS :=

y | y ∈ Zw,
∏
i∈[w]
Cyii = 1G

 . (6)
3. Given x, S, B, sample a short vector e ∈ {poly(λ) ∩ N}w such that x =∏i∈[w]Ceii .
4. For all i ∈ [w]:
(a) Let ji,0 := j0.
(b) For k = 1 to ei: compute ji,k := act(τ, ji,k−1, Ci).
(c) Let Ti := (ji,1, ..., ji,ei).
5. Let L ∈ Nw be a list where the ith entry of L is pi.
6. Output the composable encoding of x as
enc(x) = (L;T1, ..., Tw) = ((p1, ..., pw); (j1,1, ..., j1,e1), ..., (jw,1, ..., jw,ew)).
Remark 4.5 (Thinking of each adjacent pair of j-invariants as an isogeny). In each Ti, each adjacent
pair of the j-invariants can be thought of representing an isogeny φ that corresponds to the ideal class
Ci = [(pi, bi, ·)]. Over the finite field, Ci can be explicitly recovered from an adjacent pair of the j-
invariants and pi (cf. Remark 2.3). Over Z/NZ, the rational polynomial of the isogeny φ can be
recovered from the adjacent pair of the j-invariants and pi (cf. Proposition 3.9), but it is not clear
how to recover bi in the binary quadratic form representation of Ci.
Remark 4.6 (The only stateful step in the sampling algorithm). Recall that the basic setting assumes
the encoding algorithm is stateful, where the state records the prime factors of the degrees used in the
existing composable encodings. The state is only used in the first step to choose the {pi} of the ideals
in the generation set S = {Ci = [(pi, bi, ·)]}i∈[w].
20
Group operations. Given two composable encodings, the group operation is done by simply
concatenating the encodings if their degrees are coprime, or otherwise outputting “failure”.
Algorithm 4.7. The encoding composition algorithm Compose(PP, enc(x), enc(y)) parses enc(x) =
(Lx;Tx,1, ..., Tx,wx), enc(y) = (Ly;Ty,1, ..., Ty,wy ), produces the composable encoding of x◦y as follows:
• If gcd(d(enc(x)), d(enc(y))) = 1, then output the composable encoding of x ◦ y as
enc(x ◦ y) = (Lx||Ly;Tx,1, ..., Tx,wx , Ty,1, ..., Ty,wy ).
• If gcd(d(enc(x)), d(enc(y))) > 1, output “failure”.
The canonical encoding and the extraction algorithm.
Definition 4.8 (Canonical encoding). The canonical encoding of x ∈ G is x ∗ j0 ∈ Z/NZ.
The canonical encoding of x can be computed by first obtaining a composable encoding of x, and
then converting the composable encoding into the canonical encoding using the extraction algorithm.
The extraction algorithm requires the following subroutine.
Algorithm 4.9 (The “gcd” operation). The algorithm gcd.op(PP, ℓ1, ℓ2; j1, j2) takes as input the
public parameter PP, two degrees ℓ1, ℓ2 and two j-invariants j1, j2, proceeds as follows:
• If gcd(ℓ1, ℓ2) = 1, then it computes the linear function f(x) = gcd(Φℓ2(j1, x),Φℓ1(j2, x)) over
Z/NZ, and outputs the only root of f(x);
• If gcd(ℓ1, ℓ2) > 1, it outputs ⊥.
Algorithm 4.10. Ext(PP, enc(x)) converts the composable encoding enc(x) into the canonical en-
coding enc∗(x). The algorithm maintains a pair of lists (U, V ), where U stores a list of j-invariants
(j1, ..., j|U |), V stores a list of degrees where the i
th entry of V is the degree of isogeny between ji and
ji−1 (when i = 1, ji−1 is the j0 in the public parameter). The lengths of U and V are always equal
during the execution of the algorithm.
The algorithm parses enc(x) = (L;T1, ..., Tw), proceeds as follows:
1. Initialization: Let U := T1, V := (L1, ..., L1) of length |T1| (i.e. copy L1 for |T1| times ).
2. For i = 2 to w:
(a) Set utemp := |U |.
(b) For k = 1 to |Ti|:
i. Let ti,k,0 be the k
th j-invariant in Ti, i.e. ji,k;
ii. For h = 1 to utemp:
• If k = 1, compute ti,k,h := gcd.op(PP, Li, Vh; ti,k,h−1, Uh);
• If k > 1, compute ti,k,h := gcd.op(PP, Li, Vh; ti,k,h−1, ti,k−1,h);
iii. Append ti,k,utemp to the list U , append Li to the list V .
3. Return the last entry of U .
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j0 j1,1 j1,2 j1,3
j2,1
j2,2
j3,1
t2,1,1 t2,1,2 t2,1,3
t2,2,1 t2,2,2 t2,2,3
t3,1,1 t3,1,2 t3,1,3
t3,1,4
t3,1,5
ℓ ℓ ℓ
m
m
n
Figure 5: An example for the composable encoding and the extraction algorithm.
Example 4.11. Let us give a simple example for the composition and the extraction algorithms.
Let ℓ,m, n be three distinct polynomially large primes. Let the composable encoding of an element
y be enc(y) = ((ℓ); (j1,1, j1,2, j1,3)), based on the factorization of y = C
e1
1 = [(ℓ, bℓ, ·)]3. Let the
composable encoding of an element z be enc(z) = ((m,n); (j2,1, j2,2), (j3,1)), based on the factorization
of z = Ce22 ·Ce33 = [(m, bm, ·)]2 · [(n, bn, ·)]1. Then the composable encoding of x = y ◦ z obtained from
Algorithm 4.7 is enc(x) = ((ℓ,m, n); (j1,1, j1,2, j1,3), (j2,1, j2,2), (j3,1)).
Next we explain how to extract the canonical encoding of x from enc(x). In Figure 5, the j-invariants
in enc(x) are placed on the solid arrows (their positions do not follow the relative positions on the
volcano). We can think of each gcd operation in Algorithm 4.9 as fulfilling a missing vertex of a
parallelogram defined by three existing vertices.
When running Ext(PP, enc(x)), the list U is initialized as (j1,1, j1,2, j1,3), the list V is initialized as
(ℓ, ℓ, ℓ). Let us go through the algorithm for i = 2 and i = 3 in the second step.
• When i = 2, utemp equals to |U | = 3. The intermediate j-invariants {t2,k,h}k∈[|T2|],h∈[utemp] are
placed on the dotted lines, computed in the order of t2,1,1, t2,1,2, t2,1,3, t2,2,1, t2,2,2, t2,2,3. The
list U is updated to (j1,1, j1,2, j1,3, t2,1,3, t2,2,3), the list V is updated to (ℓ, ℓ, ℓ,m,m)
• When i = 3, utemp equals to |U | = 5. The intermediate j-invariants {t3,1,h}h∈[utemp] are placed
on the dashed lines, computed in the order of t3,1,1, ..., t3,1,5. In the end, t3,1,5 is appended to
U , n is appended to V .
The canonical encoding of x is then t3,1,5.
On correctness and efficiency. We now verify the correctness and efficiency of the parameter
generation, encoding sampling, composition, and the extraction algorithms.
To begin with, we verify that the canonical encoding correctly and uniquely determines the group
element in CL(O). It follows from the choices of the elliptic curves E0(Fp) and E0(Fq) with
End(E0(Fp)) ≃ End(E0(Fq)) ≃ O, and the following bijection once we fix E0:
CL(O)→ EllO(k), x 7→ x ∗ j(E0(k)), for k ∈ {Fp,Fq}
Next, we will show that generating the parameters, i.e. the curves E0,Fp , E0,Fq with a given fun-
damental discriminant D0 and a conductor f =
∏k
i fi, is efficient when |D0| and all the factors
of f are of polynomial size. Let u be an integer such that f | u. Choose a p and tp such that
t2p − 4p = u2D0. Then, compute the Hilbert class polynomial HD0 over Fp and find one of its roots
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j. From j, descending on the volcanoes Gfi(Fp) for every fi gives the j-invariant for the curve with
desired discriminant. The same construction works verbatim for q.
We then show that sampling the composable encodings can be done in heuristic polynomial time:
1. Given a logarithmically large generation set S = {Ci = [(ℓi, bi, ·)] ∈ CL(O)}i∈[w], a possibly big
basis of the relation lattice ΛS can be obtained by solving the discrete-log problem over CL(O),
which can be done in polynomial time since the group order is polynomially smooth.
2. Suppose that the lattice ΛS satisfies the Gaussian heuristic (this is the only heuristic we as-
sume). That is, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ w, the ith successive minimum of ΛS , denoted as λi, satisfies
λi ≈
√
w · h(O)1/w ∈ poly(λ). Since w = O(log(λ)), the short basis B of ΛS , produced by the
LLL algorithm, satisfies ‖B‖ ≤ 2w2 · λw ∈ poly(λ).
3. Given a target group element x ∈ CL(O), the polynomially short basis B, we can sample a
vector e ∈ Nw such that∏mi=1 Ceii = x and ‖e‖1 ∈ poly(λ) in polynomial time using e.g. Babai’s
algorithm [Bab86]. (In §5.3.3, we will explain that the GPV sampler [GPV08] is preferred for
the security purpose.)
4. The unit operation act(τ, j, C) is efficient when the ideal class C corresponds to a polynomial
degree isogeny, since it is efficient to compute polynomial degree isogenies over the finite fields.
5. The length of the final output enc(x) is (w + ‖e‖1) · poly(λ) ∈ poly(λ).
The algorithm Compose(PP, enc(x), enc(y)) simply concatenates enc(x), enc(y), so it is efficient as
long as enc(x), enc(y) are of polynomial size.
The correctness of the unit operation gcd.op follows the commutativity of the endomorphism ring O.
The operation gcd.op(PP, ℓ1, ℓ2; j1, j2) is efficient when gcd(ℓ1, ℓ2) = 1, ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ poly(λ), given that
solving the (ℓ1, ℓ2) isogenous neighbor problem over Z/NZ is efficient under these conditions.
When applying Ext() (Algorithm 4.10) on a composable encoding enc(x) = (Lx;Tx,1, ..., Tx,wx), it
runs gcd.op for maxwxi=1 |Txi | · (
∑wx
i=1 |Txi |) times. So obtaining the canonical encoding is efficient as
long as all the primes in Lx are polynomially large, and |Tx,i| ∈ poly(λ) for all i ∈ [wx].
Remark 4.12 (The parameters in practice). Let us mention the two extreme sides on the deviations
of the parameters between theory and practice that we expect. The discriminant D = D0 · f2 is
bounded by λO(log λ) asymptotically, which leads to a λO(logλ)-time attack by first guessing D, then
solving the discrete-log problem over CL(D). The bottleneck of the bound of D is at the dimension w
of the lattice ΛS, which is set to be O(log λ) so that the lattice reduction algorithm runs in polynomial
time. In practice the lattice reduction algorithms are known to outperform the asymptotic bound. So
we expect the discriminant D can be set larger than a direct estimation from λO(log λ).
On the other hand, the modular polynomials take a solid amount of space to store in practice, so we
expect the gcd operation in Algorithm 4.9 to be slow for large polynomial degrees of ℓ1 and ℓ2.
4.3 Construction - 2: General case
We describe the generalizations of the basic algorithms that offer potential optimization and flexi-
bility.
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Composing non-coprime degree encodings using “ladders”. In the basic setting of the com-
posable encodings, the group operation is feasible only for encodings with relatively prime degrees.
To support the compositions of non-relatively prime degree encodings, say the shared prime degree
is ℓ, we can include in the public parameter the encodings of
{
xi
}
i∈[k]
, where x = [(ℓ, b, ·)], k is a
polynomial. This then supports the composition of two encodings whose sum of exponents on the
degree ℓ is ≤ k.
Sampling ladders has the benefit of supporting bounded number of shared-degree compositions. In
some settings of the applications (e.g. in the broadcast encryption where the number of users is
bounded a priori), ladders enable stateless encoding sampling algorithms.
Algorithm 4.13 (Sampling a ladder). Given a polynomially large prime ℓ, a polynomial k, and an
element x = [(ℓ, b, ·)] ∈ CL(D), sample a ladder for degree ℓ of length k as follows:
1. For i = 1 to k: compute ji := act(τ, ji−1, x). (Recall j0 is the identity from the public parame-
ter.)
2. Let ladder(ℓ) := (j1, ..., jk). Include ladder(ℓ) in the public parameter.
For the convenience of the description of the group operation with ladders, let ι(ℓ, L) take as input
an integer ℓ, a list L, and output the index of ℓ in L.
Algorithm 4.14 (Composition with ladders). The algorithm Compose(PP, enc(x), enc(y)) parses
enc(x) = (Lx;Tx,1, ..., Tx,wx), enc(y) = (Ly;Ty,1, ..., Ty,wy ), produces the composable encoding of z =
x ◦ y as follows:
1. Let Lz = Lx ∪ Ly.
2. For all ℓ ∈ Lx\Lx∩Ly, let Tz,ι(ℓ,Lz) = Tx,ι(ℓ,Lx); for all ℓ ∈ Ly \Lx∩Ly, let Tz,ι(ℓ,Lz) = Ty,ι(ℓ,Ly).
3. For all ℓ ∈ Lx ∩ Ly:
• If |ladder(ℓ)| ≥ |Tx,ι(ℓ,Lx)|+ |Ty,ι(ℓ,Ly)|, then let Tz,ι(ℓ,Lz) be the list of the first |Tx,ι(ℓ,Lx)|+
|Ty,ι(ℓ,Ly)| elements in ladder(ℓ).
• If |ladder(ℓ)| < |Tx,ι(ℓ,Lx)|+ |Ty,ι(ℓ,Ly)|, then the composition is infeasible. Return “failure”.
4. Output the composable encoding of z as enc(z) = (Lz;Tz,1, ..., Tz,|Lz |).
Sample the composable encoding of a random element. In the applications we are often
required to sample (using the trapdoor) the composable encoding of a random element in G under
the generation set S = {Ci := [(ℓi, bi, ·)]}i∈[w] and. Let us call such an algorithm RandomSam(τ, S).
An obvious instantiation of RandomSam(τ, S) is to simply choose a random element x from G first,
then run TrapSam(PP, τ, x) in Algorithm 4.4.
Alternatively, we can pick a random exponent vector e ∈ [−B,B]w, and let x = ∏i∈[w]Ciei . For
proper choices of B, w, and the set of ideals, x is with high min-entropy heuristically, but figuring out
the exact distribution of x is difficult in general. If B, w, and the set of ideals are chosen according
to Lemma 2.5, then under GRH, x is statistically close to uniform over CL(O).
24
Compressing the composable encoding using the partial extraction algorithm. In the
basic setting, the composition of composable encodings keeps growing. In some application, it is
tempting to compress the composable encodings as much as possible.
We provide a partial extraction algorithm, which takes two composable encodings enc(x), enc(y) and
the public parameter as inputs. It outputs a j-invariant jx as the canonical encoding of x, and a
sequences of isogenies φy = (φ1, ..., φn) such that φn ◦ ... ◦ φ1(jx) = jx◦y (we abuse the notation by
using the j-invariant to represent an elliptic curve with such a j-invariant), where jx◦y is the canonical
encoding of x ◦ y, n is the number of the j-invariants in enc(y). In other words, φy represents the
ideal class Cy ∈ G defined by enc(y). The one-side partial extraction algorithm is useful in the
situation where the encoding enc(x) is relatively long and needs to be compressed, the encoding
enc(y) is relatively short and doesn’t have to be compressed.
Now we present the partial extraction algorithm. The algorithm first runs the basic extraction algo-
rithm Ext(PP, ·) on enc(x) (cf. Algorithm 4.10), then produces φy using enc(y) and the intermediate
information from Ext(PP, enc(x)).
Algorithm 4.15. Partial.Ext(PP, enc(x), enc(y)) maintains a pair of lists (U, V ), where U stores a
list of j-invariants (j1, ..., j|U |), V stores a list of degrees where the i
th entry of V is the degree of
isogeny between ji and ji−1 (when i = 1, ji−1 is the j0 in the public parameter). The lengths of U
and V are always equal during the execution of the algorithm.
The algorithm parses enc(x) = (Lx;Tx,1, ..., Tx,wx), enc(y) = (Ly;Ty,1, ..., Ty,wy ), proceeds as follows:
1. Initialization: Let U := Tx,1, V := (Lx,1, ..., Lx,1) of length |Tx,1|.
2. For i = 2 to wx:
(a) Set utemp := |U |.
(b) For k = 1 to |Tx,i|:
i. Let tx,i,k,0 be the k
th j-invariant in Tx,i, i.e. jx,i,k;
ii. For h = 1 to utemp:
• If k = 1, compute tx,i,k,h := gcd.op(PP, Lx,i, Vh; tx,i,k,h−1, Uh);
• If k > 1, compute tx,i,k,h := gcd.op(PP, Lx,i, Vh; tx,i,k,h−1, tx,i,k−1,h);
iii. Append tx,i,k,utemp to the list U , append Lx,i to the list V .
3. Let jx be the last entry of U .
4. Initialize a counter z := 1.
5. For i = 1 to wy:
(a) Set utemp := |U |.
(b) For k = 1 to |Ty,i|:
i. Let ty,i,k,0 be the k
th j-invariant in Ty,i, i.e. jy,i,k;
ii. For h = 1 to utemp:
• If k = 1, compute ty,i,k,h := gcd.op(PP, Ly,i, Vh; ty,i,k,h−1, Uh);
• If k > 1, compute ty,i,k,h := gcd.op(PP, Ly,i, Vh; ty,i,k,h−1, ty,i,k−1,h);
iii. Let jtemp be the last entry in U .
iv. (∗) Produce an isogeny φz of degree Ly,i such that φz(jtemp) = ty,i,k,utemp.
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v. Increase the counter z := z + 1.
vi. Append ty,i,k,utemp to the list U , append Ly,i to the list V .
6. Let φy := (φ1, ..., φn), where n = z − 1.
7. Output jx and φy.
Note that the operation (∗) can be performed efficiently due to Proposition 3.9.
The partial extraction algorithm is used in the directed transitive signature scheme to compress a
composed signature. In fact, in the DTS scheme, we need to efficiently verify that φy does represent
the ideal class Cy ∈ G defined by enc(y). We don’t know how to verify that solely from enc(y) and
the rational polynomial of φy over Z/NZ. (As mentioned in Remark 4.5, it is not clear how to recover
the explicit ideal class C given an isogeny φ over Z/NZ. Of course we can recover the norm of the
ideal from the degree of φ, but normally there are two ideals of the same prime norm.) Instead we
provide a succinct proof on the correctness of the execution of Algorithm 4.15.
Let us recall the definition of a succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG).
Definition 4.16. Let C = {Cλ : {0, 1}g(λ) × {0, 1}h(λ) → {0, 1}}λ∈N be a family of Boolean cir-
cuits. A SNARG for the instance-witness relation defined by C is a tuple of efficient algorithms
(Gen,Prove,Verify) defined as:
• Gen(1λ) take the security parameter λ, outputs a common reference string CRS.
• Prove(CRS, x, w) takes the CRS, the instance x ∈ {0, 1}g(λ), and a witness w ∈ {0, 1}h(λ),
outputs a proof π.
• Verify(CRS, x, π) takes as input an instance x, and a proof π, outputs 1 if it accepts the proof,
and 0 otherwise.
It satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: For all x ∈ {0, 1}g(λ), w ∈ {0, 1}h(λ) such that C(x,w) = 1:
Pr[Verify(CRS, x,Prove(CRS, x, w)) = 1] = 1.
• Soundness: For all x ∈ {0, 1}g(λ) such that C(x,w) = 0 for all w ∈ {0, 1}h(λ), for all polyno-
mially bounded cheating prover P ∗:
Pr[Verify(CRS, x, P ∗(CRS, x)) = 1] ≤ negl(λ).
• Succinctness: There exists a universal polynomial Q (independent of C) such that Gen runs in
time Q(λ+ log |Cλ|), the length of the proof output by Prove is bounded by Q(λ+ log |Cλ|), and
Verify runs in time Q(λ+ g(λ) + log |Cλ|).
A construction of SNARG in the random oracle model is given by [Mic00].
With a SNARG in hand, we can add in Algorithm 4.15 a proof π for the instance (enc(y), φy) and
statement “there exists an encoding enc(x) such that φy is computed from running a circuit that
instantiates Algorithm 4.15 on inputs enc(x), enc(y)”. Here the public parameter PP is hardcoded in
the circuit. The encoding enc(x) is the witness in the relation. The soundness of SNARG guarantees
that φy is an isogeny that corresponds to an O-ideal represented by enc(y). The succinctness of
SNARG guarantees that the length of the proof π is poly log(|enc(x)|) and the time to verify the
proof is poly(|enc(y)|, log(|enc(x)|)).
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Alternative choices for the class group. Ideally we would like to efficiently sample an imag-
inary quadratic order O of large discriminant D, together with the class number h(D), a generation
set {Ci} and a short basis B for ΛO, and two large primes p, q as well as curves E0,Fp, E0,Fq such that
End(E0,Fp) ≃ End(E0,Fq) ≃ O. In Section 5 we will explain that if |D| is polynomial then computing
the group inversion takes polynomial time, so we are forced to choose a super-polynomially large
|D|. On the other hand, there is no polynomial time solution for the task of choosing a square-free
discriminant D with a super-polynomially large h(D) (see, for instance, [HM00]).
In the basic setting of the parameter, we have described a solution where the resulting D is not
square-free, of size ≈ λO(log λ), and polynomially smooth. Here we provide the background if one
would like to work with a square-free discriminant D. In this case, O, the ring of integers of Q(√D),
is the maximal order of an imaginary quadratic field K.
According to the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics [CL84], about 97.7575% of the imaginary quadratic fields
K have the odd part of CL(OK) cyclic. If we choose D such that |D| ≡ 3 mod 4 and is a prime, then
h(D) is odd (by genus theory). So we might as well assume that CL(OK) is cyclic with odd order.
For a fixed discriminant D, heuristically about half of the primes ℓ satisfies
(
D
ℓ
)
= 1, so there are
polynomially many ideals of polynomially large norm that can be used in the generation set.
However, it is not clear how to efficiently choose p, q and curves E0,Fp , E0,Fq such that the endomor-
phism rings of E0,Fp and E0,Fq have the given discriminant D of super-polynomial size. The classical
CM method (cf. [LZ94] and more) requires computing the Hilbert class polynomial HD, whose cost
grows proportional to |D|. Let us remark that the CM method might be an overkill, since we do not
need to specify the number of points #(E0,Fp(Fp)) and #(E0,Fq(Fq)). However, we do not know any
other better methods.
5 Cryptanalysis
In this section we will discuss our cryptanalysis attempts, and the countermeasures.
Central to the security of our cryptosystem is the conjectured hardness of solving various problems
over Z/NZ without knowing the factors of N . So we start from the feasibility of performing several
individual computational tasks over Z/NZ; then focus on the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem over
Z/NZ, whose hardness is necessary for the security of our candidate TGII; finally address all the
other attacks in the TGII construction.
5.1 The (in)feasibility of performing computations over Z/NZ
The task of finding roots of polynomials of degree d ≥ 2 over Z/NZ sits in the subroutines of many
potential algorithms we need to consider, so let us begin with a clarification on the status of this
problem. Currently, no polynomial time algorithm is known for solving this problem in general. The
hardness of a few special instances have been extensively studied. They fall into the following three
categories:
1. For certain families of polynomials, it is known that finding a root of them over Z/NZ is
as hard as factorizing N . For example, the family of polynomials
{
fa(x) = x
2 − a}
a∈(Z/NZ)×
whose potential roots are the solutions for the quadratic residue problem [Rab79].
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2. There are families of polynomials, where finding at least one root is feasible. For example, if a
root of a polynomial over Z/NZ is known to be the same as the root over Q, then we can use
LLL [LLL82]; or if a root is known to be smaller than roughly O(N1/d), then Coppersmith-type
algorithms can be used to find such a root [Cop97]. But these families of polynomials only
form a negligible portion of all the polynomials with polynomially bounded degrees.
3. The majority of the polynomials seem to live in the third case, where finding a root is con-
jectured to be hard, however the hardness is not known to be based on integer factorization.
Among them, some specific families are even conjectured to be unlikely to have a reduction
from integer factorization. For example, when gcd(3, φ(N)) = 1, the family of polynomials{
fa(x) = x
3 − a}
a∈(Z/NZ)×
is conjectured to be hard to solve, and unlikely to be as hard as
integer factorization [BV98].
5.1.1 Feasible information from a single j-invariant
Let N = pq, as before, where p and q are large primes. From any j ∈ Z/NZ, j 6= 0, 1728, we can
easily find the coefficients a and b of the Weierstrass form of an elliptic curve E(Z/NZ) with j(E) = j
by computing a = 3j(1728 − j), b = 2j(1728 − j)2. However, this method does not guarantee that
the curve belongs to a specific isomorphism class (there are four of them). By choosing a value
u ∈ (Z/NZ)× and let a∗ = u4a, b∗ = u6b one gets the coefficient of another curve with the same
j-invariant, each belonging to one of the four isomorphism classes.
On the other hand, choosing a curve over Z/NZ with a given j-invariant together with a point on
the curve seems tricky. Note that there are methods of sampling a curve with a known ℓ-torsion
point over Z/NZ (cf. [Kub76, Sut12a]). But with the additional constraint on the j-invariant, these
methods seem to require solving a non-linear polynomial over Z/NZ.
Nevertheless, it is always feasible to choose a curve together with the x-coordinate of a point on it,
since a random x ∈ Z/NZ is the x-coordinate of some point on the curve with probability roughly
1
2 . It is also known that computing the multiples of a point P over E(Z/NZ) is feasible solely using
the x-coordinate of P (cf. [Dem93]). The implication of this is that we should at the very least not
give out the group orders of the curves involved in the scheme. More precisely, we should avoid the
j-invariants corresponding to curves (or their twists) with polynomially smooth cardinalities over
either Fp or Fq. Otherwise Lenstra’s algorithm [Len87] can be used to factorize N .
In our application we also assume that the endomorphism rings of E(Fp) and E(Fq) are isomorphic
and not given out to begin with. Computing the discriminant of O ≃ End(E(Fp)) ≃ End(E(Fq))
or the number of points of E over Z/NZ seems to be hard given only N and a j-invariant. In
fact Kunihiro and Koyama (and others) have reduced factorizing N to computing the number of
points of general elliptic curves over Z/NZ [KK98]. However, these reductions are not efficient in
the special case, where the endomorphism rings of E(Fp) and E(Fq) are required to be isomorphic.
So, the result of [KK98] can be viewed as evidence that the polynomial time algorithms for counting
points on elliptic curves over finite fields may fail over Z/NZ without making use of the fact that
the endomorphism rings of E(Fp) and E(Fq) are isomorphic.
5.1.2 Computing explicit isogenies over Z/NZ given more than one j-invariant
Let ℓ be a prime. We will be concerned with degree ℓ isogenies. If we are only given a single
j-invariant j1 ∈ Z/NZ, then finding an integer j2 such that Φℓ(j1, j2) = 0 (mod N) seems hard.
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j0
j1
j2
j3j = ?
φ0,1 φ1,2
φ2,3
φ1,0 φ2,1
φ3,2φ0,−1 = ?
Figure 6: A pictorial description of the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem.
We remark that Theorem 3.3 does not guarantee that finding j2 is as hard as factoring when the
endomorphism rings of E(Fp) and E(Fq) are isomorphic. However, as of now, we do not know how
to make use of the condition that the endomorphism rings are isomorphic to mount an attack on the
problem.
Of course, in the construction of a TGII, we are not only given a single j-invariant, but many j-
invariants with each neighboring pair of them satisfying the ℓth modular polynomial, a polynomial
degree ℓ + 1. We will study what other information can be extracted from these neighboring j-
invariants.
In Proposition 3.9, we have explained that given two integers j1, j2 ∈ Z/NZ such that Φℓ(j1, j2) = 0
over Z/NZ, the elliptic curves E1, E2, and the kernel polynomial h(x) of an isogeny φ from E1, E2
can be computed in time polynomial in ℓ, log(N). However, it is not clear how to use the explicit
expression of φ to break factoring or solve the inversion problem.
A natural next step is to recover a point in the kernel of φ, but it is also not clear how to recover
even the x-coordinate of a point in the kernel when ℓ ≥ 5. For ℓ = 3, on the other hand, the kernel
polynomial does reveal the x-coordinate of a point P in the kernel G ⊂ E1[3] (note that h(·) is
of degree 1 in this particular case). But revealing the x-coordinate of a point P ∈ E1[3] does not
immediately break factoring, since 3P is O over both Fp and Fq. At this moment we do not know
of a full attack from a point in ker(φ). Nevertheless, we still choose to take an additional safeguard
by avoiding the use of 3-isogenies since it reveals the x-coordinate of a point in E1[3], and many
operations on elliptic curves are feasible given the x-coordinate of a point.
5.2 Tackling the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem
The hardness of infeasible inversion of our group representation in fact relies on the hardness of
the following generalization of the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem (cf. Definition 3.6). Let the
modulus N = pq, where the large prime factors p and q are hidden. Let ℓ be the degree of the
isogenies. For a polynomially large k ∈ N and a given a sequence of integers j0, j1, j2, ... jk such
that Φℓ(ji−1, ji) = 0 (mod N) for all i ∈ [k], the problem asks to find an integer j−1 such that
Φℓi+1(j−1, ji) = 0 (mod N) for all i ∈ [k]. In addition, for all i ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} the endomorphism rings
of Ei,Fp , Ei,Fq are isomorphic to an imaginary quadratic order O (O is supposed to be hidden for
reasons to be explained later). See Figure 6 for the pictorial description of the problem.
From the discussion in § 5.1.2 we know that it is feasible to compute the kernel polynomials of the
isogenies φi,i+1 and their duals φi+1,i, for i = 0, ..., k − 1. Denote these kernel polynomials by hi,i+1
and hi+1,i respectively. If one can compute the kernel polynomial h0,−1 of the isogeny φ0,−1 that
maps from j0 to j one can then solve the (ℓ, ℓ
2)-problem. Since h0,1 can be recovered, there is a
chance of obtaining h0,−1 from h0,1. As mentioned in Remark 2.3, over a finite field, the two kernel
polynomials h0,−1 and h0,1 of the two horizontal isogenies can be explicitly related via the Frobenius
endomorphism. However it is not clear how to use the relation over Z/NZ.
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Another attempt is to see if φ1,0(ker(φ1,2)) gives ker(φ0,−1) (the map φ1,0(ker(φ1,2)) can be computed
using Newton’s identities). However, applying φ1,0 on the kernel subgroup G1,2 of φ1,2 gives ker(φ0,1),
since φ0,1 ◦ φ1,0(G1,2) = [ℓ]G1,2 = O, so it does not give the desired kernel subgroup.
5.2.1 Hilbert class polynomial attack
Let D be the discriminant of the imaginary quadratic order O that we are working with. If computing
the Hilbert class polynomial HD is feasible, then we can solve the (ℓ, ℓ
2)-isogenous neighbor problem.
Given j0, j1 such that Φℓ(j0, j1) = 0, compute the polynomial γ(x),
γ(x) := gcd(Φℓ(j0, x),Φℓ2(j1, x),HD(x)) ∈ (Z/NZ)[x].
The gcd of Φℓ(j0, x) and Φℓ2(j1, x) gives a polynomial of degree ℓ. The potential root they share
with HD(x) is the only one with the same endomorphism ring with j0 and j1, which is j−1. So γ(x)
is a linear function.
This attack is ineffective when D is super-polynomial.
5.2.2 Deciding the direction of an isogeny on the volcano
Fix an isogeny volcano Gℓ(Fq) over a finite field Fq. As we mentioned, given a j-invariant j on Gℓ(Fq)
there are efficient algorithms that output all the ℓ-isogenous neighbors of j. When there are 1 or
2 neighbors, we know j is at the bottom of the volcano (the case of 2 neighbors corresponding to
when the volcano consists just of the surface). When there are more than 2 (i.e. ℓ + 1) neighbors,
can we decide which isogeny is ascending, horizontal, or descending? The method mentioned in
[Koh96, FM02, Sut13a] takes a trial and error approach. It picks a random neighbor and goes
forward, until the path reaches one of the terminating conditions. For instance, if it reaches a point
where there is only one neighbor, then that means the path is descending; if the path forms a loop,
or takes longer than the estimated maximum depth of the volcano, then the initial step is ascending
or horizontal.
The only algorithm that is able to produce an isogeny with a designated direction is given by Ionica
and Joux [IJ13]. They recognize an invariant related to the group structure of the curves lying on
the same level of the volcano. The highlevel structure of the algorithm is as follows:
1. First decide the group structure via a pairing ([IJ13] uses reduced Tate pairing).
2. Then find the kernel subgroup with a property that depends on whether the desired isogeny is
ascending, descending, or horizontal.
Either steps seem to carry out over Z/NZ. One of the main barriers is to compute (even the
x-coordinate of) a point that sits in the specific subgroup of the curve.
The precise descriptions of the invariant and the algorithm are rather technical. So we only sketch
the main theorem from [IJ13], skipping many technical details. Let n ≥ 0, let E[ℓn](Fqk) be the
subgroup of points of order ℓn defined over an extension field over Fq. Let E[ℓ
∞](Fq) be the ℓ-Sylow
subgroup of E(Fq).
Let m be an integer such that m | #E(Fq). Let k be the embedding degree, i.e. the smallest integer
that m | qk − 1. Let Tm : E[m](Fqk) × E(Fqk)/mE(Fqk) → µm be the reduced Tate pairing, where
µm denotes the m
th roots of unity. Furthermore, define the symmetric pairing
S(P,Q) = (Tℓn(P,Q)Tℓn(Q,P ))
1/2,
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and call S(P,P ) = Tℓn(P,P ) the self-pairing of P .
Theorem 5.1 (The main theorem of [IJ13], informally). Let E be an elliptic curve defined a finite
field Fq and let E[ℓ
∞](Fq) be isomorphic to Z/ℓ
n1Z× Z/ℓn2Z with n1 ≥ n2 ≥ 1. Then
• Suppose P is a ℓn2-torsion point such that Tℓn2 (P,P ) is a primitive ℓn2th root of unity. Then
the ℓ-isogeny whose kernel is generated by ℓn2−1P is descending.
• Suppose certain condition holds, and let P be a ℓn2-torsion point with degenerate self-pairing.
Then the ℓ-isogeny whose kernel is generated by ℓn2−1P is either ascending or horizontal.
Moreover, for any ℓn2-torsion point Q whose self-pairing is non-degenerate, the isogeny with
kernel spanned by ℓn2−1Q is descending.
Carrying out the algorithm of finding an isogeny with a specific direction (say horizontal) requires
finding (even merely the x-coordinate of) a point in the designated subgroup. Over a finite field, such
points can be found efficiently by picking a random point R and compute P =
#(E(Fq))
r R, where r is
the order of the designated subgroup; then test if the candidate point P lies in the correct subgroup
by taking pairing. Over Z/NZ it seems hard even to find a point with a specific order since we do
not know #E(Z/NZ). Even if we are able to find points in desired subgroups, there are additional
technicalities such as computing pairing over Z/NZ (cf. [GM05]).
In our application we are mostly interested in finding the unvisited neighbor over Z/NZ that lies on
the same level of the volcano, which equals to finding the horizontal isogeny of a given curve. As
we conjectured, the algorithm in [IJ13] do not extend to Z/NZ. So if the task of finding an isogeny
with a designated direction is feasible over Z/NZ, then it is likely to imply a new algorithm of the
same task over the finite field, which seems to be challenging on its own.
5.2.3 More about modular curves and characteristic zero attacks
Given j, solving Φℓ(j, x) is not the only way to find the j-invariants of the ℓ-isogenous curves.
Alternative complex analytic (i.e. characteristic zero) methods have been discussed, for instance,
in [E+98, Section 3]. However, these methods all involve solving polynomials of degree ≥ 2 to get
started.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the curve H/Γ0(ℓ) parameterizes pairs of elliptic curves over C related
by a cyclic ℓ-isogeny. The (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem, on the other hand, concerns curves
that are horizontally ℓ-isogenous, i.e. ℓ-isogenous and have the same endomorphism ring. To avoid
an attack through characteristic zero techniques, we make sure that there is no immediate quotient
of H that parametrizes curves which are related with an ℓ-isogeny and have the same endomorphism
ring. Below, we first go over the well-known moduli description of modular curves4 to make sure
that they don’t lead to an immediate attack, and then show that there is indeed no quotient of H
between H/SL2(Z) and H/Γ0(ℓ), so we don’t have to worry about possible attacks on that end.
Let Γ := SL2(Z), and let Γ(ℓ) and Γ1(ℓ) denote the congruence subgroups,
Γ(ℓ) :=
{(
a b
c d
)
∈ SL2(Z)
∣∣∣∣
(
a b
c d
)
≡
(
1 0
0 1
)
(mod ℓ)
}
,
4Recall that a modular curve is a quotient of the extended upper half plane by a congruence subgroup, and a
congruence subgroup is a subgroup of SL2(Z), which contains Γ(ℓ).
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Γ1(ℓ) :=
{(
a b
c d
)
∈ SL2(Z)
∣∣∣∣
(
a b
c d
)
≡
(
1 ∗
0 1
)
(mod ℓ)
}
.
It is well-known that the curves H/Γ1(ℓ) and H/Γ(ℓ) parametrize elliptic curves with extra data on
their ℓ-torsion (cf. [Koh96]). H/Γ1(ℓ) parametrizes (E,P ), where P is a point on E having order
exactly ℓ, and H/Γ(ℓ) parametrizes triples (E,P,Q), where E[ℓ] = 〈P,Q〉 and they have a fixed
Weil pairing. These curves carry more information than the ℓ-isogenous relation and they are not
immediately helpful for solving the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem.
As for the quotients between H/SL2(Z) and H/Γ0(ℓ), the following lemma shows that there are
indeed none.
Lemma 5.2. Let ℓ be a prime. If H ≤ Γ is such that Γ0(ℓ) ≤ H ≤ Γ, then either H = Γ0(ℓ) or
H = Γ.
Proof. Let σ1 = ( 1 10 1 ), σ2 = (
1 0
1 1 ), σ3 = σ1σ
−1
2 , and recall that SL2(Z/ℓZ) = 〈σ1, σ2〉 = 〈σ1, σ3〉.
Recall that the natural projection π : Γ → SL2(Z/ℓZ) is surjective. Assume that H 6= Γ0(ℓ).
This implies that π(H) = SL2(Z/ℓZ) (we shall give a proof below). Assuming this claim for the
moment let g ∈ Γ\H. Since π(Γ) = π(H) there exists h ∈ H such that π(g) = π(h). Therefore,
gh−1 ∈ ker(π) = Γ(ℓ) ⊂ H. Therefore, g ∈ H and Γ = H.
To see that π(Γ) = π(H), first note that since Γ0(ℓ) ⊂ H we have all the upper triangular matrices
in π(H). Next, let h =
(
h1 h2
h3 h4
)
∈ H\Γ0(ℓ) such that π(h) =
(
h¯1 h¯2
h¯3 h¯4
)
∈ π(H)\π(Γ0(ℓ)) (note that
this difference is non-empty since otherwise Γ0(ℓ) = H).
We have two cases depending on h¯1 = 0 or not. If h¯1 = 0 then h¯3 6= 0 and σ3 =
(
h¯−1
3
h¯4
0 h¯3
)
h¯−1 ∈
π(H). On the other hand, if h¯1 6= 0 multiplying on the right by
(
h¯−11 −h¯2
0 h¯1
)
∈ π(H) we see that(
1 0
h¯3h¯
−1
1 1
)
∈ π(H) . For any integer m, the m’th power of this matrix is
(
1 0
mh¯3h¯
−1
1 1
)
∈ π(H). Taking
m ≡ h¯1h¯−13 shows that σ2 ∈ π(H). This shows that π(H) = SL2(Z/ℓZ).
Let us also remark that for special values of ℓ the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem may be more
prone to characteristic zero attacks (although we do not know of such an attack). For instance, for
those ℓ for which H/Γ0(ℓ) (more precisely, its compactification X0(ℓ)) is genus 0 or 1, it (may) have
many rational points. These points, in turn, can be used to get points over Z/NZ without knowing
the factorization of N . Nevertheless, we may just avoid these values in the system. As mentioned
above, we currently do not see an attack based on this. This point is brought up just as an extra
precautionary measure.
5.3 Cryptanalysis of the candidate group with infeasible inversion
We now cryptanalyze the concrete candidate TGII. Recall the format of an encoding of a group
element x from Definition 4.2:
enc(x) = (Lx;Tx,1, ..., Tx,wx) = ((px,1, ..., px,wx); (jx,1,1, ..., jx,1,ex,1), ..., (jx,wx,1, ..., jx,wx,ex,wx )).
The “exponent vector” ex ∈ Zwx can be read from the encoding as ex = (|Tx,1|, ..., |Tx,wx |).
We assume polynomially many composable encodings are published in the applications of a TGII.
In down-to-earth terms it means the adversary is presented with polynomially many j-invariants on
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the crater of a volcano, and the explicit isogenies between each pair of the neighboring j-invariants
(due to Proposition 3.9).
We will be considering the following model on the adversary’s attacking strategy:
Definition 5.3 (The GCD attack model). In the GCD attack model, the adversary is allowed to try to
find the inverse of a target group element only by executing the unit gcd operation gcd.op(PP, ℓ1, ℓ2; j1, j2)
given in Algorithm 4.9 for polynomially many steps, where ℓ1, ℓ2; j1, j2 are from the published encod-
ings or obtained from the previous executions of the gcd evaluations.
We do not know how to prove the construction of TGII is secure even if the adversary is restricted
to attack in the GCD model. Our cryptanalysis attempts can be classified as showing (1) how to
prevent the attacks that obey the GCD evaluation law (mainly in §5.3.1 and §5.3.2); (2) how to
prevent the other attack approaches.
5.3.1 Preventing the trivial leakage of inverses
In applications we are often required to publish the encodings of elements that are related in some
way. A typical case is the following: for x, y ∈ CL(O), the scheme may require publishing the
encodings of x and z = y ◦ x−1 without revealing a valid encoding of x−1. As a toy example, let
x = [(px, bx, ·)], y = [(py, by, ·)], where px and py are distinct primes. Let j0, the j-invariant of a
curve E0, represent the identity element in the public parameter. Let ((px); (jx)) be a composable
encoding of x and ((py); (jy)) be a composable encoding of y.
Naively, a composable encoding of z = y ◦x−1 could then be ((px, py); (jx−1), (jy)), where jx−1 is the
j-invariant of Ex−1 = x
−1E0. Note, however, that ((px); (jx−1)) is a valid encoding of x
−1. In other
words such an encoding of y ◦ x−1 trivially reveals the encoding of x−1.
One way of generating an encoding of z = y ◦ x−1 without trivially revealing jx−1 is to first pick
a generator set of ideals where the norms of the ideals are coprime to px and py, then solve the
discrete-log of z over these generators to compute the composable encoding. This is the approach
we take in this paper.
5.3.2 Parallelogram attack
In the applications we are often required to publish the composable encodings of group elements
a, b, c such that a ◦ b = c. If the degrees of the three encodings are coprime, or in general, when
enc(a), enc(b) and enc(c) are pairwise composable, then we can recover the encodings of a−1, b−1,
and c−1 using the following “parallelogram attack”. This is a non-trivial attack which obeys the gcd
evaluation law in Definition 5.3.
Let us illustrate the attack via the examples in Figure 7, where the solid arrows represent the
isogenies that are given as the inputs (the j-invariants of the target curves are written at the head
of the arrows, their positions do not follow the relative positions on the volcano; the degree of the
isogeny is written on the arrow); the dashed lines and the j-invariants on those lines are obtained
from the gcd evaluation law.
For simplicity let us first look at the example in the left figure. Let composable encodings of a,
b, c be simply given by (ℓ1; (j1)), (ℓ2; (j2)), (ℓ3; (j3)), where ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3 are polynomial and pairwise
coprime. A composable encoding of b−1 then can be written as (ℓ2; (j4)), where j4 is the root of the
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Figure 7: The parallelogram attack.
linear equation f(x) = gcd(Φℓ3(j1, x),Φℓ2(j0, x)). This is due to the relation c ◦ b−1 = a, which, in
particular implies that j1 and j4 are connected by an isogeny of degree ℓ3.
The simple attack above uses the fact that the degrees of the entire encodings of a, b and c are
polynomial. Let us use the example in the right figure to illustrate that even if the encodings are
composed of many polynomial degree isogenies (so that the total degrees may be super-polynomial),
the attack is still effective. The idea is to view the composition law as filling the missing edges of a
parallelogram given the j-invariants on a pair of adjacent edges. The final goal is to find the missing
corner j12 in the parallelogram j0− j3− j1− j12. To arrive there we need the j-invariants on a pair of
adjacent edges to begin with, so we first have to fill the j-invariants on, for instance, the edge j1− j3.
Therefore, as the first step, we consider the parallelogram j0− j2− j3− j1. To fill the j-invariants on
the edge j1 − j3, we first compute j7 as the root of f7(x) = gcd(Φℓ4(j5, x),Φℓ5(j4, x)), then compute
j8 as the root of f8(x) = gcd(Φℓ1(j7, x),Φℓ5(j1, x)) (the polynomials f7, f8 are linear since the degrees
of enc(a) and enc(b) are coprime). In the second step, we consider the parallelogram j0−j3−j1−j12.
To find j12 we use the gcd evaluation law to find j9, j10, j11, j12 one-by-one (using the condition that
the degrees of enc(c) and enc(b) are coprime).
In the previous examples we illustrated that the attack is applicable when the degrees of enc(a),
enc(b), enc(c) are coprime. Let us also remark that the attack applies as long as enc(a), enc(b),
enc(c) are pairwise composable, i.e. they don’t have to be of coprime degrees, which happens when
the ladders in the general algorithms are applied (cf. Algorithm 4.13 in §4.3).
The parallelogram attack is very powerful, in the sense that it is not preventable when application
requires to publish the composable encodings of a, b, c such that a ◦ b = c, and enc(a), enc(b), enc(c)
to be pairwise composable. However, the parallelogram attack does not seem to work when 2 out of
the 3 pairs of enc(a), enc(b) and enc(c) are not composable. In the applications of directed transitive
signature and broadcast encryption, there are encodings of a, b, c such that a◦b = c. Luckily, only one
pair of the encodings among the three has to be composable to provide the necessary functionalities
of these applications. We will explicitly mention how to choose the prime factors in the degrees of
these encodings to prevent the parallelogram attack.
5.3.3 Hiding the class group invariants: why and how
The hardness of discrete-log problem over CL(D) is necessary for the infeasibility of inversion5. Recall
from Lemma 2.5 that, under GRH, the graph GO,m(k) for a sufficiently large m is an expander,
which means it is reasonable to assume that the closure of the composition of polynomially many
j-invariants covers all the h(D) j-invariants. So finding a composition of the published j-invariants
5The actual group with infeasible inversion is CL(D)odd; here we discuss over CL(D) for notational simplicity.
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that reaches a specific vertex (e.g. the vertex that represents the inverse of some encoded element)
in the isogeny graph is feasible by solving the discrete-log problem over CL(D).
However, in the basic setting of the parameters, the class number h(D) is polynomially smooth, so
the discrete-log problem over CL(D) can be solved in polynomial time once h(D) is given, and h(D)
can be recovered from D or any basis of a lattice Λ of dimension w such that Zw/Λ ≃ CL(D). So
we do need to hide the discriminant D, the class number h(D), and any lattice Λ defined above.
If self-composition of an encoding is feasible, then one can efficiently guess all the polynomially
smooth factors of h(D). However for our construction self-composition is infeasible, due to the
hardness of the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem. Nevertheless, one can still attack by first guessing
D or h(D), which takes λO(λ) time according to the current setting of parameter.
We remark that if it is feasible to choose a super-polynomially large square-free discriminant D with
a trapdoor τD so that solving discrete-log over CL(D) given D is hard but feasible given the trapdoor
τD, then we might be able to maintain the security of the system even if D and h(D) are public.
This would avoid all the complications in hiding the class group invariants. However currently we
do not know of such a method, so we need to hide the class group invariants.
The possibility of recovering the discriminant D. Recall that for an elliptic curve over
a finite field Fq, the discriminant D can be obtained by first computing the trace t of Frobenius,
and then computing the integers v and D0 such that v
2D0 = t
2 − 4q, and D0 is square-free. Then
D = u2D0, where u | v. When v is smooth D can be recovered efficiently.
Over Z/NZ, on the other hand, since we loose the notion of the Frobenius automorphism, we do not
know how to apply the previous algorithm. Also, just a set of j-invariants over Z/NZ, corresponding
to curves with the same endomorphism rings over Fp and Fq, does not seem to allow us to recover
the discriminant.
However, we do know that the range of D is bounded by |D| ≤ 4p and |D| ≤ 4q, so that |D| < √N .
From the encodings we also learn the set PB =
{
p ≤ B | p is a prime, (Dp ) = 1}, where B ∈ poly(λ).
This brings us to the following problem of independent interest:
Definition 5.4. Given an integer N and a set of primes P = {p1, ..., pm}, find a negative value D
such that |D| < √N and (Dp) = 1 for all p ∈ P.
Note that each condition
(
D
p
)
= ±1 cuts the possible D’s roughly by half. Hence, for a sequence
ǫ1, ǫ2, · · · , ǫω(log(N)), ǫj ∈ {±1}, with high probability there is at most one D with |D| <
√
N that
satisfies ǫj =
(
D
pj
)
. To find such a D, on the other hand, is a separate problem and the only known
methods require
√|D| of the values of the sequence {ǫj} (cf. pg. 6 of [Hof14], also see pg. 14 of loc.
cit. and [GH93] for the analogue of the same problem in the context of modular forms)
We also remark that the following similar problem, first mentioned by Damg˚ard [Dam88], is conjec-
tured to be hard:
Definition 5.5 (Problem P1 in [Dam88]). The Legendre sequence with length ℓ and starting point
a is the ±1 sequence
L =
(
a
p
)
,
(
a+ 1
p
)
, ...,
(
a+ ℓ
p
)
.
Given L (with a polynomial ℓ) but not a and p, the problem asks to determine
(
a+ℓ+1
p
)
.
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Even if Problem 5.4 can be solved efficiently, an obvious safeguard is to choose less than log(|D|)
many primes for the degrees of the isogenies involved in the composable encodings. However, it is
not always possible to restrict the number of distinct prime degrees in applications. In that case,
we can apply another safeguard by first choosing an enlarged set of k polynomially large primes
R = {p1, ..., pk}, and letting R′ be a random subset of R. We can then set D = (
∏
p∈R′ p)
2D0, where
D0 is a polynomial size fundamental discriminant. Then in the composable encodings, we avoid the
primes from the entire set R as the degrees of the isogenies.
The possibility of revealing Λ. Revealing any full-rank (not necessarily short) basis B of a
relation lattice Λ of dimension w such that Zw/Λ ≃ CL(D) implies the disclosure of the class number
h(O) = |det(B)|. So we should prevent leaking any full-rank bases of such lattices.
An immediate consequence is that we cannot give out many non-trivial encodings of 1G (where
G = CL(O)) that form a full-rank basis of a potential relation lattice Λ. Recall that the trivial
(i.e. canonical) encoding of 1G is j0. A non-trivial encoding of 1G can be obtained by composing
encodings which lead to a non-zero exponent vector. As an example, suppose that the encodings of
x, y, z ∈ CL(O) share the same prime generation set of norm from L, and x ◦ y ◦ z = 1G, and denote
them by enc(v) = (L;Tv,1, ..., Tv,|L|), v ∈ {x, y, z}. Then, the following vector is in Λ
ex◦y◦z = (|Tx,1|+ |Ty,1|+ |Tz,1|, ..., |Tx,|L||+ |Ty,|L||+ |Tz,|L||).
Note that in the example we are not required to compute the composable encoding of x ◦ y ◦ z. We
only need to read off the exponents from the lengths of T∗,⋆.
In the applications we do face the situation where the general security setting does not restrict
the number of non-trivial encodings of 1G. A countermeasure is to enforce each distinct non-zero
encoding of 1G to have an new ideal with distinct prime norm, so that the dimension of the potential
basis is larger than the possible number of vectors (relations) to be collected. We will illustrate how
to apply this countermeasure in the applications.
Even for the encodings of non-identity elements, sampling the vector e from an arbitrary distribution
over the cosets of Λ might leak a basis. For example, [NR06] shows that if there are enough short
vectors from the parallelepiped of a short basis, then one can find the parallelepiped and, therefore,
recover the basis.
The countermeasure is to sample the vector ex ∈ Zwx from the discrete-Gaussian distribution
[GPV08]. The sampler is known of being basis-independent.
Formally, for any σ ∈ R+, c ∈ Rn, define the (non-normalized) Gaussian function with center c and
standard deviation σ for any x ∈ Rn as ρσ,c(x) = e−π‖x−c‖2/σ2 . For any n-dimensional lattice Λ,
define the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ as:
∀x ∈ Λ, DΛ,σ,c(x) = ρσ,c(x)
ρσ,c(Λ)
,
where ρσ,c(Λ) :=
∑
y∈Λ ρσ,c(y) is the normalization factor.
Lemma 5.6 ([MR07]). Let B be a basis of an n-dimensional lattice Λ, and let σ ≥ ‖B˜‖ · ω(log n),
then Prx←DΛ,σ,0[‖x‖ ≥ σ ·
√
n ∨ x = 0] ≤ negl(n).
Lemma 5.7 ([GPV08, BLP+13]). There is a p.p.t. algorithm that, given a basis B of an n-
dimensional lattice Λ(B), c ∈ Rn, and σ ≥ ‖B˜‖
√
ln(2n + 4)/π, outputs a sample from DΛ,σ,c.
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Note, however, that sampling from discrete-Gaussian distribution could lead to a vector with negative
entries. Having negative entries as the exponent vector might trivially leak the inverse of other
encodings (as mentioned in § 5.3.1). There are at least two solutions to this problem. One is to
sample a vector v0 with positive large entries in Λ, then add v0 on any other vectors v
′ sampled
from discrete-Gaussian so that v0 + v
′ have all positive entries (this solution does leak one vector
v0 in Λ). The other solution is to pick at least one new prime ideal in the generation set of each
composable encoding, so that the inverse won’t be trivially obtained from the other encodings.
The possibility of leaking h(D) from other sources. We have discussed the possibilities of
leaking D and a basis of ΛO from the encodings and the corresponding countermeasures. It remains
to check whether there are other possibilities of leaking h(D).
Again recall that in the basic parameter setting, h(D) is set to be polynomially smooth. The
immediate consequence is that in the encodings, we shall not use prime degrees ℓ such that the order
of the ideal class [(ℓ, b, ·)] is polynomially large in CL(D), to avoid the risk of unnecessarily leaking
any factors of h(D).
Additionally, we ask:
1. Given an encoding, is it feasible to recognize that it encodes an element of polynomial order in
the group CL(O)?
2. Given an encoding of an element that is known to be of polynomial order, is the order explicitly
revealed (instead of having an 1/poly(λ) chance of being guessed correctly)?
If self-composition is feasible, then the answers to both questions are yes. But for our construction,
self-composition of the encoded group elements is infeasible.
Denote the degree of an encoding enc(x) by d and the order of x in CL(O) by r. Let the canonical
encoding of enc(x) be jx. In the special case where d
r is polynomially large, then we can efficiently
recognize that enc(x) has order r by first guessing dr and then testing whether Φd(j0, jx) = 0
(mod N), and Φdr−1(j0, jx) = 0 (mod N). The presence of such an encoding then leaks r as a factor
of the group order.
One way of minimizing the possibility of having an element with small order is to choose the prime
factors of h(O) to be as large as possible. For example, we can choose D0 and the odd prime factors
of fi − 1 (where fi is a prime factor of the conductor) to be larger than O(λ3).
5.4 Miscellaneous
On the decisional version of the inversion problem. Like the typical hard problems in
cryptography, a search problem usually comes with a decisional variant. For the hardness of inversion,
the natural way of defining the decision problem is to say that given a group element x, it is hard
to decide whether a string s represents x−1 or a random group element. While in the ideal interface
of (T)GII the decisional variant is easy, simply due to the fact that one can compose x and s, then
check if the result is equal to 1G or not. In our concrete instantiation, the following variant of the
decisional problem has a chance to be hard:
Definition 5.8 (Decisional inversion problem). Given the public parameter PP and a (composable)
encoding enc(x), decide whether a string s represents the canonical encoding of x−1 (namely j(x−1 ∗
E0)) or a random value in (Z/NZ)
×.
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Given that the canonical encoding is not composable, there is a chance that the decisional problem
is hard. However, when the degree of enc(x) is a polynomial d, Problem 5.8 is easy, since we can test
whether Φd(j0, s) = 0 (mod N) or not (in contrast, we conjecture the search problem is hard even
for polynomial degree encodings). If the encoding is of super-polynomial degree, then the decisional
problem seems hard.
We remark that the applications of this paper do not necessarily rely on the hardness of the decisional
version of the inversion problem, so the cryptanalysis effort we spend on the decisional problem is
not as much as the search problem.
Rational points on X0(ℓ). Rational points on X0(ℓ) give solutions to Φℓ(x, y) = 0 over Z/nZ
for any n ∈ N, unless the denominators of x or y are not in (Z/nZ)×. Recall that the genus of the
modular curve X0(ℓ) grows linearly with ℓ, hence for large ℓ, by Faltings’ theorem, there are only
finitely many rational points on X0(ℓ). So for large ℓ, one cannot hope to find ℓ-isogenous neighbors
over Z/NZ by first finding points over Q and then reducing them mod N . For small ℓ, on the other
hand, there are rational points that seem to be easy to find.
Let P = (x, y) be such a (Q-rational) point on X0(ℓ), where neither x nor y is equal to 0 or 1728.
The presence of these points, on one hand, allows one to easily find one j-isogenous neighbor of x
mod N (if the denominator of x is invertible in Z/NZ), that is y mod N .
On the other hand, for an attack towards the (ℓ, ℓ2)-neighbor problem one would like to find two
Q-rational points P,Q sharing a common coordinate (i.e. either xP = xQ or yP = yQ). We remark
that having such Q-rational points is highly unlikely for large ℓ. More precisely, wlog assume that
xP = xQ. Then yP and yQ correspond to the j-invariants of ℓ
2-isogenous curves. They, moreover,
are both in Q, and hence the point (yP , yQ) defines a Q-rational point on X0(ℓ
2). If ℓ > 7, X0(ℓ
2)
has genus strictly great than 1 and therefore has finitely many rational points. Therefore, for ℓ > 7
even if one can find a pair of Q-rational points P and Q on X0(ℓ), it is highly unlikely that they
would share a common coordinate.
Although we do not see an immediate attack through rational points on X0(ℓ), we can always take
ℓ > 7 for extra precaution.
5.5 Summary
We summarize the potential attacks and the countermeasures.
The adversary is given the public parameters N , j0, and polynomially many composable encodings,
each containing several j-invariants connected by isogenies of polynomial degrees. Following Propo-
sition 3.9 we can recover all the explicit isogenies between neighboring j-invariants. Given that we
choose all the prime degrees ℓ of the isogenies to be ≥ 5 (or > 7 for extra precaution), the explicit
isogenies do not trivially leak the x-coordinates of the points in the kernel of the isogeny.
We should avoid leaking the number of points on those elliptic curves over Fp and Fq with endomor-
phism ring O. Otherwise the adversary can pick a random x as the x-coordinate of a random point
on the curve, and run Lenstra’s factoring algorithm to factorize N .
Central to the hardness of inversion is the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem over a composite mod-
ulus N with unknown factorization. Among the potential solutions to the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor
problem, finding the one corresponding to the image of a horizontal isogeny would break our candi-
date group with infeasible inversion, so it is worth investigating algorithms which find isogenies with
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specific directions. However, the only known such algorithm, that of [IJ13], does not seem to work
over Z/NZ.
In the concrete instantiation of a group with infeasible inversion, the adversary can always try to
reach new j-invariants by performing the legal GCD operations. Such attacks are captured under
the model given in Definition 5.3. The parallelogram attack is a powerful attack under this model.
It is effective when given the composable encodings of group elements a, b, c such that a ◦ b = c,
and the degrees of the three encodings are coprime. This attack can be prevented when 2 out of
the 3 pairs of the degrees of enc(a), enc(b) and enc(c) are not composable. In the applications of
the directed transitive signature and the broadcast encryption, we are able to set the parameters to
prevent the attack.
Under GRH the isogeny graph is an expander, which means given polynomially many composable
encodings, it is reasonable to assume that the closure of the composition covers all the h(D) j-
invariants. However, finding a path of composition to reach a specific point (e.g. the inverse of some
encoding) may still require solving the discrete-log problem over CL(D). Under the current choice
of parameters, the discrete-log problem over CL(D) can be solved efficiently once h(D) is given,
and h(D) can be recovered efficiently given D or any relation lattice Λ of dimension w such that
Zw/Λ ≃ CL(D). So we should prevent leaking any of Λ, D, or h(D).
The discriminant D cannot be polynomially large for two reasons: First, if D ∈ poly(λ), then we can
guess D and compute the class number in polynomial time, which enables us to efficiently solve the
discrete-log problem over CL(D). Second, we can also compute the Hilbert class polynomial HD in
polynomial time and therefore solve the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem.
Even if D is super-polynomial, it should be kept hidden. Since D has to be hidden, we cannot give
out a plaintext group element of CL(D) that allows efficient group operation, e.g. the quadratic form
representation of an ideal class [(a, b, c)] (cf. Section 2.1), since the discriminant D can be read off
from b2 − 4ac.
Finally, we also remark that if we were able to choose a super-polynomially large square-free dis-
criminant D with a trapdoor τD, so that solving discrete-log over CL(D) is hard if one is given only
D, but feasible if one is given the trapdoor τD, then we can construct a system with D and h(D)
being public, which would avoid all the complications in hiding D and h(D).
6 Directed transitive signature for directed acyclic graphs
The concept of transitive signature (DTS) was introduced by Rivest and Micali [MR02]. In a tran-
sitive signature scheme the master signer is able to sign on the edges of a graph G using the master
signing key. Given the signatures on a specific set S of edges, say S = {(u, v), (v,w)}, everyone
can compute the signature on the edge (u,w), and in general, any edge in the transitive closure of
S, but not for any edge beyond the transitive closure of S. Transitive signatures are useful in the
scenario where the graph represents some authorization relationship. The master signer has limited
availability and has the intention of signing a limited number of edges ahead of time. New users can
then dynamically join the graph, build edges, and obtain the composed signatures if the edges live
in the transitive closure of the existing ones.
Transitive signatures for undirected graphs are constructed in [MR02, BN02] and many others. But
for directed graphs, only the special case of directed trees was achieved by Yi [Yi07] from the RSA
assumption. However, Neven later gave a construction of DTS for directed trees from any standard
digital signature, which shows that directed trees are indeed simpler to achieve [Nev08].
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We instantiate DTS from TGII for any directed acyclic graph (DAG). The basic instantiation directly
follows the construction from [Hoh03, Mol03], where the signatures are the composable encodings
of some group elements. Since the lengths of the composable encodings in our TGII keep growing
during composition, the lengths of the composed signatures grow proportionally to the number of
individual signatures. However, a DTS where the lengths of composed signatures grow proportionally
to the number of individual signatures is trivially achievable – simply use any signature scheme and
interpret the concatenation of a signature on the edge
−→
ij and a signature on the edge
−→
jk as the
signature on the edge
−→
ik – as was explicitly mentioned in [Mol03, Page 14].
To provide a DTS scheme with short composed signatures, we add a signature compressing step
using the partial extraction algorithm (Algorithm 4.15) described in the general version of TGII in
Section 4.3. However, the compressed signature cannot be further composed with other signatures,
so the scheme has not yet met the ideal definition of DTS provided by [Hoh03, Mol03]. Still, being
able to compress the final composed signature is desirable for a DTS, and it does not seem to be
trivially achievable.
6.1 Definition
We adopt the definition of a directed transitive signature from [Hoh03, Mol03].
Definition 6.1. A directed transitive signature scheme DTS = (Gen,Cert,Sign,Compose,Ver) con-
sists of the following tuple of efficient algorithms:
• Gen: The key generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1λ, returns the
master public-key secret-key pair (MPK,MSK).
• Cert: The node certification algorithm Cert takes as input the master secret key MSK and a
node i ∈ N, returns (PK(i),SK(i)), a public value and a secret value for node i.
• Sign: The edge signing algorithm Sign takes as input the master secret key MSK, the source
node i and destination node k, and the associated (PK(i),SK(i)), (PK(k),SK(k)), outputs a
signature σi,k of the edge
−→
ik.
• Compose: The composition algorithm Compose takes as input MPK, two consecutive edges −→ij ,−→
jk, and the signatures σi,j, σj,k, outputs a signature σi,k for the edge
−→
ik.
• Ver: The verification algorithm Ver takes as input the edge −→ik and its public values PK(i),PK(k),
and a potential signature σ′, returns 1 iff σ′ is a valid signature of the edge
−→
ik , 0 otherwise.
In this paper we will be considering the simplest definitions of correctness and security (we refer
the readers to [Hoh03, Mol03] for the more formal definitions). For correctness we require that the
verification algorithm outputs 1 on all signatures obtained from compositions in the transitive closure
of edges signed by the master signing key. For security we require that it is infeasible for any p.p.t.
adversary to forge a signature beyond the transitive closure of the signed edges. The adversary is
allowed to dynamically add nodes and edges in the graph, and is allowed to request the master signer
to sign as long as the target edge for forgery does not trivially fall in the transitive closure of the
signed edges.
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6.2 A directed transitive signature scheme for DAGs via TGII
Assume the DAG in the protocol has n vertices [1, 2, ..., n]. All the directed edges
−→
ik are heading
from a lower index to a higher index, i.e. i < k (any DAG has at least one topological ordering).
Construction 6.2 (DTS via TGII). Given a trapdoor group with infeasible inversion TGII, a stan-
dard digital signature scheme DS, construct a directed transitive signature DTS as follows:
• Gen: The key generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1λ and runs
the TGII parameter generation algorithm to produce the public parameters TGII.PP and the
trapdoor τ of a group G = (◦, 1G). It also generates the signing and verification keys for
the regular signature scheme DS.Gen(1λ) → DS.SK,DS.VK. It returns the master public-key
DTS.MPK = (TGII.PP,DS.VK) and the master secret-key DTS.MSK = (τ,DS.SK).
• Cert: The node certification algorithm Cert takes as input the master secret key DTS.MSK =
(τ,DS.SK) and a node i ∈ N, samples a random element xi ∈ G and a composable encoding
enc(xi), and sets the encoding to be the public information for i:
PK(i) := enc(xi) = TGII.TrapSam(TGII.PP, τ, xi).
The secret information on node i can be set as SK(i) = x−1i , or simply be left as ⊥ since the
master trapdoor holder can invert PK(i) = enc(xi) to get x
−1
i . Cert then produces the signature
Σ(i) = DS.Sign(DS.SK, i||PK(i)) and takes Σ(i) as the certificate of node i.
• Sign: The edge signing algorithm Sign takes as input the master secret key DTS.MSK =
(τ,DS.SK), a source node i, a destination node k, and the associated (PK(i),SK(i)), (PK(k),SK(k)).
It first verifies the node certificates, then recovers x−1i from SK(i) and xk from PK(k). It then
outputs
σi,k := enc(x
−1
i ◦ xk) = TGII.TrapSam(TGII.PP, τ, x−1i ◦ xk).
• Compose: The composition algorithm Compose takes as input MPK, two consecutive edges −→ij ,−→
jk, and the signatures σi,j, σj,k, outputs σi,j ◦ σj,k as the composed signature for the edge
−→
ik.
• Ver: The verification algorithm Ver takes as input the edge −→ik and its public values PK(i),PK(k),
and a potential signature σ′. It parses the public information as (i, enc(i),Σ(i)), (k, enc(k),Σ(k)).
If any of the certificates on the nodes is invalid, it returns 0. Otherwise, it checks whether
Ext(TGII.PP, enc(i) ◦ σ′) = Ext(TGII.PP, enc(k)).
If so it returns 1, otherwise it returns 0.
Choosing the generation sets S. Now we provide a detailed instantiation of the DTS using our
basic version of the TGII (cf. § 4.2). The only parameters left to be specified are the primes {pi}
of the generation set S = {Ci = [(pi, bi, ·)]}i∈[w] ⊂ G = CL(O)odd in the first step of the (stateful)
encoding sampling algorithm (cf. Algorithm 4.4). To do so we need to clarify which encodings
are composable in the system and which are not (for functionality); whether there are pairwise
composable encodings of a, b, c that satisfy a ◦ b = c (to prevent the parallelogram attack detailed
in § 5.3.2); and whether we are able to hide the bases of the relation lattices (to prevent the attack
detailed in § 5.3.3).
One way of choosing the generation sets is as follows: Let the following be sets of O-ideals of distinct
prime norms, each set is of size O(log(λ)): Si,src, Si,dst, for all i ∈ [n], and Scommon.
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• Let the generation set for PK(i) = enc(xi) be Scommon ∪ Si,dst, plus another O-ideal of prime
norm ℓi that has never been used.
• Let the generation set for σi,k = enc(x−1i ◦ xk) be Si,src ∪ Sk,dst, plus another O-ideal of prime
norm ℓi,k that has never been used.
Let us first check correctness of our construction: For each index i ∈ [n], the public key on node i,
PK(i) = enc(xi), should be composable with all the edges
−→
jk with j ≥ i (for correctness it is not
important if PK(i) is composable with any other edges or vertices). A signature σi,k = enc(x
−1
i ◦xk)
should be composable with any signature σi′,k′ such that i
′ ≥ k, or k′ ≤ i, and with any public value
PK(h) such that h ≤ i, but not with any other vertices or edges. So our assignment of the prime
ideals supports the necessary composition functionalities.
We now verify that the parallelogram attack from § 5.3.2 does not apply to our construction: In the
DTS scheme there are two ways of obtaining composable encodings of a, b, c such that a ◦ b = c.
1. Through the compositions of the signatures on the edges
−→
ij ,
−→
jk,
−→
ik , which gives
σi,j ◦σj,k = σi,k ⇒ Ext(TGII.PP, enc(x−1i ·xj)◦enc(x−1j ·xk)) = Ext(TGII.PP, enc(x−1i ·xk)). (7)
Our choices of the generation sets make sure that σj,k and σi,k are not composable due to the
common Sk,dst; σi,j and σi,k are not composable due to the common Si,src.
2. Through the verification algorithm on the public values PK(i), PK(k), and the signature on
−→
ik ,
which gives
PK(i) ◦ σi,k = PK(k)⇒ Ext(TGII.PP, enc(xi) ◦ enc(x−1i · xk)) = Ext(TGII.PP, enc(xk)). (8)
Our choices of the generation sets make sure that PK(i) and PK(k) are not composable due to
the common Scommon; σi,k and PK(k) are not composable due to the common Sk,dst.
Therefore, in both cases, two of the three pairs of the degrees share prime factors. Therefore the
parallelogram attack does not apply.
Finally, we verify that it is unlikely to leak a full-rank basis of any relation lattice of CL(O). Note
that the only two ways of obtaining non-trivial encodings of the identity are mentioned in Eqn. (7)
and Eqn. (8). Due to the fresh prime ideal inserted in the generation set of each encoding, there are
always more dimensions than the number of linearly independent relations in a potential relation
lattice, which means it is unlikely to obtain any full-rank basis of such a lattice.
Remark 6.3 (Why not supporting waiting signatures). The definition of DTS from [Hoh03] addi-
tionally allows the signatures to be signed, composed, or verified over non-consecutive edges. Such
signatures are called waiting signatures. The DTS construction from ideal TGII in [Hoh03, Mol03]
naturally supports waiting signatures. To do so, the verification algorithm Ver takes as input two
multisets of sources and destinations Psrc = {a1, ..., az}, Pdst = {b1, ..., bz}, and a potential signature
σ′. It checks whether
Ext(TGII.PP, σ′ ◦ enc(a1) ◦ ... ◦ enc(az)) = Ext(TGII.PP, enc(b1) ◦ ... ◦ enc(bz)).
If so returns 1, otherwise returns 0.
Our TGII construction is able to support waiting signatures in terms of functionality, but not security.
The reason is: to verify waiting signatures, we would have to make sure that all the public values of
the vertices are composable. But then the parallelogram attack would apply through Eqn. (8). The
attacker would then be able to recover the encoding of x−1i , which is the secret-key on node i.
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Compressing the composed signature. The definition of [Hoh03, Mol03] additionally requires
that for any consecutive edge in the graph, the composed signature should be indistinguishable from
a signature produced by the master signer. We remark that the DTS from our basic version of the
TGII (cf. §4.2) does not achieve this property, since the signatures grow as they are composed6.
Instead, we will provide a signature compression technique using the partial extraction algorithm
from the general version of TGII in §4.3. The compression can only be applied to a composed
signature σi,k which can be verified (given PK(i) and PK(k)) but can no longer be composed with
other signatures. Our construction, therefore, does not fully achieve the indistinguishability definition
of [Hoh03, Mol03], in the sense that a compressed signature cannot be composed with others later.
To obtain the compressed signature, we apply Partial.Ext(TGII.PP, σi,k,PK(i)) to obtain the j-invariant
j−→
ik
= Ext(TGII.PP, σi,k), the isogeny φi : j−→ik → jxk that represents PK(i), and a SNARG π for the
instance (PK(i), φi) and statement “there exists a string str such that φi is computed from run-
ning a circuit that instantiates Algorithm 4.15 on inputs str, φi”. Let (j−→ik , φi, π) be the compressed
signature. Note that its size depends only on the security parameter.
We change the verification algorithm as follows: Ver takes as input a source node a, a destination
node b, and a potential compressed signature (j, φ, π) for an edge from a to b. It parses the public
information as (a, enc(a),Σ(a)), (b, enc(b),Σ(b)) and if any of the certificates on the nodes is invalid
it returns 0. Otherwise, it checks:
• Whether φ(j) = Ext(TGII.PP, enc(b)),
• Whether π is a valid proof for the following statement: there is a string str such that φ is
obtained by applying Algorithm 4.15 over the input str, enc(a).
If both of the checks pass, returns 1, otherwise returns 0.
The correctness of the verification algorithm follows from the correctness of the encoding algorithm,
the algorithm Partial.Ext, and the completeness of the SNARG. The soundness of SNARG guarantees
that the isogeny φ is obtained honestly from applying Partial.Ext on some string str and enc(a), which
means φ correctly represents PK(a) and therefore j must be Ext(TGII.PP, enc(a−1 ◦ b)).
Furthermore, we can use a zero-knowledge SNARG (from e.g. [Gro16]), so that the compressed
signature is indistinguishable from a compressed signature produced by the master signer.
7 Broadcast encryption
A broadcast encryption scheme allows the encrypter to generate ciphertexts that are decryptable by
a designated subset of the receivers. A trivial solution for broadcast encryption is to simply encrypt
the message many times for each user’s decryption key. Although this does provide a solution, it
clearly is not effective as the number of receivers grow. A meaningful broadcast encryption scheme
needs to be more efficient on at least one of: the cost of encryption, size of the public parameters,
or the sizes of users’ decryption keys (cf. [FN93]).
In this section we give a concrete instantiation of the broadcast encryption scheme of Irrer et al.
[ILOP04], which was designed under the ideal interface of GII. Our instantiation supports private-
key encryption and allows any numbers of users to collude. The encryption overhead and the users’
6The same happens in the DTS from the TGII implied by the self-bilinear maps with auxiliary inputs [YYHK14],
where the auxiliary input in the composed encoding keeps growing.
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secret keys are independent of the total number of the users n, however the public parameter size is
linear in n. Let us remark that our aim here is to give a concrete application of our TGII construction
and hence we did not try to optimize the public parameter overhead. Let us also mention that the
asymptotic efficiency of our scheme has been achieved by the construction in [BGW05] using bilinear
maps. There are other schemes in literature that achieve log(n) public parameter overhead under
the assumption of the security of multilinear maps [BWZ14] or iO [Zha14]. We leave the challenge
of achieving smaller public parameter blowup from GII or TGII to the interested reader.
7.1 Definition
A private-key broadcast encryption scheme consists of a tuple of efficient algorithms:
• Setup(1λ): The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ, then generates the
public parameters PP and the master secret key MSK.
• Gen(PP,MSK, u): The user key generation algorithm takes as input the user id, u, in the list
of users U . It generates a secret key SKu and (possibly) a public key PKu for user u. PKu is
included in the public parameters.
• Enc(PP,MSK,Γ,m): The encryption algorithm takes as input a polynomial size set Γ ⊆ U
of recipients. It applies a deterministic algorithm over PP,MSK,Γ to derive a key K of a
symmetric-key encryption scheme. Denoting the encryption of the message m under K by
CTK,m, it outputs CT = (Γ,CTK,m).
• Dec(PP, u,SKu,CT): The decryption algorithm first parses CT as (Γ,CTK,m) and derives the
symmetric-key K from PP,SKu, and Γ. It then uses K to decrypt CTK,m.
The scheme is said to be correct if for all subsets of the users Γ ⊆ U and for all messages m, any user
u from the set Γ decrypts the correct message, i.e. Dec(PP, u,SKu,Γ,Enc(PP,MSK,Γ,m)) = m.
For security we consider the simplest form of the key-recovery attack, defined by the following “key-
recovery” game between an adversary and a challenger.
1. The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate a master secret key MSK and the public
parameters. The challenger then picks a set of users U and generates the public keys and the
secret keys of the users. The adversary is given U and all the public parameters.
2. The adversary picks a subset Γ ⊆ U of users where it wants to attack. The challenger gives the
adversary all the secret keys for the users not in Γ, i.e. SKu for u /∈ Γ.
3. The adversary can make encryption queries on any messagem and any subset Γ′ ⊆ U (including
Γ′ = Γ). The challenger runs the Encrypt algorithm to obtain CT = Enc(PP,MSK,Γ′,m) and
sends to the adversary.
4. The adversary outputs a symmetric key K∗ and wins the game if K∗ is equal to the symmetric
key K derived from PP, MSK and Γ, loses otherwise.
A broadcast encryption scheme is said to be secure if for any polynomial time adversary the odds of
winning the key-recover game is negligible.
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Construction |param| |user key| |CT| Based on PK CR
[FN93] O(t2n log n) O(t log2 t log n) O(t2 log2 t log n) RSA assumption No ≤ t users
[ILOP04] O(n) O(1) O(1) Ideal GII No Arbitrary
[BGW05] I O(n) O(1) O(1) Bilinear maps Yes Arbitrary
[BGW05] II O(
√
n) O(
√
n) O(1) Bilinear maps Yes Arbitrary
[BWZ14] O(log n) O(log n) O(log n) Mmaps Yes Arbitrary
[Zha14] O(log n) O(log n) O(log n) iO Yes Arbitrary
This work O(n) O(1) O(1) A concrete TGII No Arbitrary
Figure 8: A brief summary of the existing collusion resistant broadcast encryption schemes. n
represents the number of users; “PK” stands for supporting public key encryption; “CR” stands for
being collusion resistant. All the parameters ignore the (possibly multiplicative) poly(λ) factors.
7.2 A private-key broadcast encryption scheme from TGII
We first present the construction from an abstract TGII, then specify the parameters in detail.
Construction 7.1 (Broadcast encryption under an abstract TGII). Given a trapdoor group with
infeasible inversion TGII and a symmetric-key encryption scheme Sym, construct a broadcast encryp-
tion scheme BE as follows:
• BE.Setup(1λ): The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ, runs the TGII
parameter generation algorithm to produce the public parameters TGII.PP and the trapdoor τ
of a group G = (◦, 1G). Then sample a random element s ∈ G. The public parameter BE.PP
is set to be TGII.PP. The master secret key BE.MSK includes τ and s.
• BE.Gen(BE.PP,BE.MSK, u): The user secret key generation algorithm parses τ, s from BE.MSK.
It samples a random element x ∈ G, computes enc(x) ← TGII.TrapSam(TGII.PP, τ, x) as the
user’s public key PKu; computes enc(s ◦ x) ← TGII.TrapSam(TGII.PP, τ, s ◦ x) and treats it as
the user’s secret key SKu.
• BE.Enc(BE.PP,BE.MSK,Γ,m): The encryption algorithm takes as input a polynomial size
set Γ ⊆ U of recipients and a message m. It first computes the message encryption key
K =
(∏
i∈Γ xi
) ◦ s, then computes Sym.CTK,m := Sym.Enc(K,m) and outputs BE.CT =
(Γ,Sym.CTK,m).
• BE.Dec(BE.PP, u,SKu,CT): The decryption algorithm extracts the set Γ from BE.CT, takes
the public keys PKi for users i ∈ Γ \ u, the secret key SKu for user u, and computes K ′ =
Ext(TGII.PP,
∏
i∈Γ\u(PKi) ◦ SKu). It then decrypts Sym.CTK,m using K ′.
To be more cautious, we can also apply a randomness extractor on K to derive a key that is
statistically close to the uniform in distribution.
Choosing the generation sets. We now provide the detailed instantiation of the broadcast
encryption scheme using our basic version of the TGII (cf. Section 4.2). Similar to the situation
of the DTS, the only parameters left to be specified are the primes {pi} in the generation set
S = {Ci = [(pi, bi, ·)]}i∈[w] ⊂ G = CL(O)odd in the first step of the (stateful) encoding sampling
algorithm (cf. Algorithm 4.4).
45
One way of choosing the primes for the generation sets is as follows. Choose sets of O-idelas Si for
i ∈ U and Smsk such that they consist of ideals of distinct prime norms and each one of them is of
size O(log(λ)).
• Let the generation set of PKi = enc(xi) be Si, plus another O-ideal of prime norm ℓi that has
never been used.
• Let the generation set of SKi = enc(xi ◦ s) be Si ∪ Smsk, plus another O-ideal of prime norm
ℓ′i that has never been used.
Let us first check the correctness. The secret key SKi does not have to be composable with any
other secret keys, it has to be composable with all the public keys except PKi. The PKi has to be
composable with everything other than SKi. So our assignment of the prime ideals supports the
necessary composition functionalities.
We will now consider the parallelogram attack from Section 5.3.2. Since the only parameters in the
encryption scheme are SKu and PKv for u, v ∈ U , the only way we can obtain a identity of the type
a ◦ b = c is through the relations
PKi ◦ SKk = PKk ◦ SKi, (9)
where the public-key secret-key pairs are PKi = enc(xi), SKi = enc(xi ◦ s), PKk = enc(xk), SKk =
enc(xk ◦s). The attack scenario in Eqn. (9) may happen when Users i and j collude to find the secret
keys of other users.
Our choices of the generation sets make sure that SKi and SKk are not composable for any i, k due
to the common Smsk. Similarly, SKi and PKi are not composable for any i due to the common Si. So
there are two out of three pairs of the degrees that share prime factors. Therefore, our instantiation
is secure to the parallelogram attack.
Finally we check whether there is a chance of leaking a full-rank basis of any relation lattice of
CL(O). Note that the only two ways of obtaining non-trivial encodings of the identity are mentioned
in Eqn. (9). Due to the new prime ideals inserted in the generation set of each encoding, there are
always more dimensions than the number of linearly independent relations in a potential relation
lattice, which means it is unlikely to obtain any full-rank basis of such a lattice.
Remark 7.2. The scheme we presented above makes a slight change over the original scheme of
Irrer et al. [ILOP04]. In [ILOP04] the user’s secret key is x and the user’s public key is s ◦ x. The
encryption key with respect to the set Γ is K =
(∏
i∈Γ xi
) ◦ s|Γ|−1. Whereas in our scheme we flip
the public key and secret key, and change the encryption key accordingly. The purpose of the change
is to provide a candidate instantiation where only the short-basis of the relation lattice for Smsk has
to be computed.
Note that this change does not affect the security analysis from [ILOP04], which shows that a key
recovery attack to the broadcast encryption scheme implies the ability of computing inverses.
Remark 7.3. The CPA-style security definition in [BGW05] requires that it is hard to distinguish
a correct decryption key from a random key. Our scheme is also a candidate that satisfies the CPA
definition when the decisional inversion problem is hard, which is plausible under the current setting
of parameters.
8 Future directions
We conclude the paper with several future directions.
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Further investigation of the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbors problem. The hardness of the
(ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbor problem over Z/NZ is necessary for the security of our candidate trapdoor
group with infeasible inversion. Let us remark that once the adversary is given two j-invariants that
are ℓ-isogenous, she can recover the rational polynomial of the isogeny, which is not available in the
ℓ-isogenous neighbor problem where the adversary is given a single j-invariant as input. Although
it is not clear how to use the explicit rational polynomial of the isogeny to mount an attack, it
should serve as a warning sign that the (ℓ, ℓ2)-isogenous neighbors problem might be easier than the
ℓ-isogenous neighbors problem.
Proving security in the GCD evaluation model. The GCD evaluation model (cf. Defini-
tion 5.3) provides a simplified interface for the attacker. It will be interesting to prove (or disprove)
that the TGII is secure if the adversary is restricted to follow the GCD evaluation model.
Looking for alternative constructions of GII or TGII. Given the complications and the lim-
itations of our construction of TGII, one might want to look for a simpler or a different construction
of GII or TGII. Some concrete directions to study further are:
1. A construction, where the encoding is stateless.
2. A construction, where the size of the encoding does not grow with composition.
3. A (T)GII candidate for a non-commutative group.
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